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The FFG-7 Class ship acquisition program began in 1970
and is scheduled to include more than 50 hulls / or about
20 percent of the Navy's surface ships, upon completion of
the project in 1988. This thesis reviews the chronology of
the FFG-7 Class and analyzes some of the major historical
events in its development in an attempt to discover the
reasons for increased manning and accommodation require-
ments. Analysis showed weaknesses in the manpower
requirements determination process and in the coordination
of ship acquisition managers with manpower planners and
fleet units. Recommendations are presented to improve the
ship manpower documentation (SMD) program and coordination
of manpower planning, operational, and project design
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In 197 0, the U. S. Navy recognized that with the de-
activation of many of its remaining World War II era
destroyers, new ship acquisition programs were needed to
provide the level of escort capability required in the
1980 's and beyond. In November of 1970, Admiral E. R.
Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his staff
developed a Navy shipbuilding concept providing a spectrum
of ships representing a balance between smaller numbers of
very capable ships to operate in high threat areas and
large numbers of smaller, but effective, lower cost ships
for less demanding tasks. The DD-963 Spruance Class was
designed to help provide the high mix and the FFG-7 Class
the smaller, but effective low mix (LOMIX)
.
The FFG-7 Class was designed for minimum manning, as
that was one of the features of the LOMIX concept. During
the design and concept phase of the FFG-7, a manning
ceiling of 163 officers and enlisted men, and an accommoda-
tions limit of 185 bunks were developed. Today, the FFG-7
Class has 181 officers and enlisted men authorized, with a
proposal in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) -81 for
additional billets. The Class is also currently under-
going an alteration to increase the number of accommodations




This thesis reviews the chronology of the FFG-7 Class
and analyzes some of the major historical events in its
development in an attempt to discover the reasons for such
an increase in manning and accommodations
.
C. SCOPE
Data and information were obtained through research
of published literature. Navy FFG-7 Class documents, and
of Navy correspondence. Interviews were conducted with
many personnel involved with the FFG-7, and a one-week
research trip was made to Navy organizations in Washington,
D. C. and Norfolk, Va.
Chapter II of this thesis identifies the FFG-7 design
constraints, its mission and characteristics, and the
manning concepts developed by the designers to remain
within the constraints. Chapter III focuses on the Navy's
Ship Manpower Document (SMD) program and its impact on the
FFG-7. Alternatives to the methodology used for this SMD
program are also described. Chapter IV addresses the
current status of the FFG-7 Class manning concepts, the
trend toward a more experienced personnel force, and the
Navy's efforts regarding manpower versus hardware procure-
ment tradeoffs. Finally, conclusions and recommendations





This chapter discusses the development of the USS
OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Class ship. The chapter is
divided into three sectiois. The first section considers
the three constraints placed upon the designers by the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . The three constraints
limited cost, displacement, and accommodations. The
second section describes the ship's mission, its current
characteristics and future additions to the ship. The
final section addresses many of the manning concepts
developed by the designers to remain within the constraints
placed upon them. They include: (1) ship's organizational
changes; (2) modifications of watchstations; (3) develop-
ment of a Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) ; (4) establishment
of a systems training concept; and (5) the use of the FFG-7
as a two-year leadship (i.e., FFG-7 was commissioned two




Prior to 1966, the Navy's ship acquisition process
was known as Design to Requirements. The proposed ship
was designed by the Navy and then contracted with either
private or Navy shipyards for actual construction. Ships
were designed to meet performance requirements. From 1966
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through 1971 ships were acquired through total package
procurement. In this approach, the Navy was limited to
concept formulation and contract definition. The ship
design and construction was done by a private shipyard
under a single contract. The Spruance (DD-963) and
Tarawa (LHA-1) class ships were acquired under this total
package procurement plan. In the early 1970 's the total
package procurement plan was replaced by the design-to-
cost approach. The design-to-cost process is similar to
the earlier design-to-requirements program, but cost is
recognized as a design parameter in the new plan. Cost
goals are established early during the ship design and are
subjected to trade-offs with schedule and performance.
The OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Class was the first design-
to-cost ship acquisition program. It was designed with a
fellowship construction cost goal of $45.7 million and a
threshold of $50 million in fiscal year 1973 dollars. The




The FFG-7 displacement goal was the second major
design constraint. The DD-963 Class, under the total
package procurement plan, had developed a 7,8 00 ton
displacement. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , now
using cost as a driving factor, was not going to allow the
displacement of the FFG-7 to be as great as the DD-963
Class. In order to remain within the $45 million goal, the
13

CNO set a displacement goal of 3,400 tons and a limit of
3,600 tons fully loaded. Provisions have been made for
proposed additions totaling an additional 50 tons, but any
new equipment or modification over the 50 tons will force
the removal of other equipment [Beecher, 1978]
.
3 . Accommodations
Cost again played an important role in determining
the number of accommodations on the FFG-7 Class ship. The
CNO directed that there would be 185 bunks in order to
reduce life cycle costs, particularly manpower. Standard
Navy policy for new ship construction is to provide an
accommodation margin of 10 percent over estimated manning
requirements, including directed requirements such as
staff embarkments and aviation detachments. For the FFG-7,
the CNO approved a five percent accommodation growth margin
The purpose of the margin is to allow for future growth
over the lifetime of the ship. The FFG-7 leadship experi-
ence has caused 30 additional bunks to be added to the
ships in the Class. This addition is at the expense of
crew habitability [Nauta, 1978] . The bunk alteration will
be conducted as follows: (1) FFG-7 during their second
Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) ; (2) FFG-8 through
18 will have additional bunks installed during their first
SRA; (3) FFG-19 through 34 during their Post Shakedown
Availability (PSA); and (4) FFG-36 and later fellowships
will have additional bunks installed during construction
14

[Naval Sea Systems Command, 1980] . This accommodations
constraint has caused many of the concepts, delineated
in the Concept section of this chapter, to be developed.
How the Navy was able to meet, through the design and
production phases, the 185 bunk limitation is discussed
in the Ship's Manpower Document (SMD) portion of this
thesis.
B. MISSION
The mission of the FFG-7 Class is to conduct worldwide
combat operations at sea, in support of national policy.
The ship will supplement planned and existing escorts in
the protection of underway replenishment groups, amphi-
bious forces, and military and mercantile shipping against
subsurface, air, and surface threats. The ship will also
contribute to sea control and to a lesser degree sea denial
in order to ensure our use of essential sea lanes of
communication and trade [FFG-7 Class Maintenance Plan
Doctrine, 1979]. This ship is not required, by design, to
fulfill missions such as to escort carrier task forces,
which are appropriate for much larger and faster ships,
i.e., the multipurpose destroyer.
C. SHIP CHARACTERISTICS
The FFG-7 Class ship is a single-screw, gas turbine-
powered guided missile frigate comparable in size to the
USS BROOKE (FFG-1) Class, but manned by a significantly
15

smaller crew. The combat systems department has been
designed for optimum operation under minimum manning condi-
tions. Two AN/UYK-7 digital computers integrate the ship's
command and decision system with the ship's weapon systems.
In addition to standard AN/UYA-4 consoles at the radar
tracker and antisubmarine air controller positions, the
command and decision system includes operations summary
consoles for the tactical action officer (TAO) and anti-
submarine warfare evaluator. The combat information center
operates in a Navy tactical data system (NTDS) environment
with standard symbology, real-time data analysis, and
computer programs designed to provide quick reaction
defense throughout the multi-threat spectrum [Duich, 1978]
.
The main propulsion system includes two LM 2500 gas
turbine engines driving a single controllable and reversible
pitch propeller through a conventional main reduction gear
and shafting assembly and a Navy-unique, synchronized,
self-shifting clutch. A computerized propulsion control
system provides a semi-automatic control with digital
displays and data printouts, while programmed throttle and
pitch control is available in the central control station
and on the bridge. Ship service electric power is supplied
by four lOOOKW 60 HZ diesel-driven generators and three
400 HZ static frequency converters [Nauta, 1978].
The ship is a conventional, two-deck, longitudinally
framed steel destroyer with an aluminum deckhouse.
16

Displacement at full load is 3,64 5 tons, including space
and weight reservations for planned growth. The sustained
speed of the ship at full power is in excess of 27 knots.
Other characteristics of the FFG-7 Class are as listed in
Table I [FFG-7 Class Maintenance Plan Doctrine, 1979].
D. CONCEPTS
The CNO wanted the FFG-7 Class frigate to have increased
operational availability over current ships in the fleet,
and he wanted it to have minimum manning [FFG-7 Class
Maintenance Plan Doctrine, 1979] . This was in addition to
the three constraints of cost, displacement, and accom-
modations described earlier in this chapter. In order to
meet the desires of the CNO, designers had to modify
several traditional concepts. They included: (1) ship's
organizational changes; (2) modification of watchstations;
(3) development of a Class Maintenance Plan (CMP)
;
(4) establishment of a systems training concept, and
(5) the use of the FFG-7 as a two-year leadship.
1. Ship's Organizational Changes
The traditional frigate is organized into the
following departments: operations, weapons, supply,
aviation, administration, and engineering. The FFG-7
Class has instead: combat systems, ship control/communica-
tions, support, aviation, and engineering departments as

















(MK 13 Mod 4) for
Standard and Harpoon
missiles
One MK 7 5 Oto Melara
(76 mm) rapid fire gun
Two MK 32 triple
torpedo mounts with




(LAMPS I or II)
SQS-56 direct path
sonar
SPS-49 long range air
search radar MK 92
Mod 2 fire control
system SPS-55 surface
search radar
In addition, the following items are planned for
subsequent fellowships and retrofit onto current FFG-7
Class ships [Nauta, 1978] :
Vulcan/Phalanx close-in weapon system.
Lamps III completely replacing Lamps I.
Link 11 tactical data transfer system associated
with Lamps III.
Tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS)
.
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control/communications, and support departments are the
department heads. The role of the division officer is
assumed by the senior enlisted petty officer in each
division. The FFG-7 deck division also has its differ-
ences from tradition. Personnel in this division stand
no underway watches. A new (as compared to earlier classes
of ships) facilities maintenance (FM) program increases the
division's responsibility not only for deck and seamanship
evolutions, but for the cleanliness and maintenance of all
topside and common-use spaces as well. The division is
equipped with various labor-saving devices such as spray
wax buffers, wet and dry vacuums, high-pressure washers,
and longer lasting paint. In the engineering department
most propulsion, electrical, and damage control equipment
is started and operated by a two-man watch in the central
control station. In addition, two rovers (forward and aft)
patrol and monitor the unmanned auxiliary machinery
systems and equipment. The support department is designed
to incorporate a traditional supply organization with as
many of the ship's administrative functions as possible.
Advances in the support supply area include a central
galley which serves the enlisted dining facility, the
chief petty officer mess, and the wardroom. A stores
elevator which moves foodstuffs from the main deck to
storerooms and ammunition to the Oto Melara gun magazine
eases the labor requirements for food and ammunition-
20

handling working parties. A central supply storeroom
which contains aviation-style drawer cabinets for the
stowage of repair parts is located below the flight deck
for ease in the transfer of stores during replenishment
operations. Still another change is the incorporation of
a central office complex. Within this single space is
located the ship's administrative office, the combat
systems department office, the engineering log room, the
support office, and the ship control/communications
department office. This central office also has control
of the general announcing system for the daily routine of
the ship [Duich, 1978]
.
2 . Modification of Watchstations
A traditional bridgewatch consists of two officers
and between 11 and 13 enlisted personnel. The Proposed
Ship Manning Document (PSMD) for the FFG-7 Class requires
a watch team of one officer and five enlisted personnel
in the bridge area. This concept was based on two
proposals [Nauta, 1978]
.
First, all ship control functions should be
integrated into a ship control console, the operation of
which is controlled and monitored by one enlisted console
operator and the officer of the deck. The second proposal
was the development of a ship control rating combining the
functional duties and knowledge of the quartermaster,
signalman, and boatswain mate ratings. The personnel
21

would then be trained and qualified in a broad range of
skills to obtain cross-utilization within a functional
area. Additionally, the auxiliary machinery spaces were
automated to eliminate the requirement for a watchstation
[Nauta, 1978]
.
3 . Class Maintenance Program
The FFG-7 Class also requires a non-traditional
maintenance strategy in order to fulfill its objectives.
The maintenance strategy adopted for the FFG-7 Class
includes several unique characteristics [FFG-7 IMAV/SRA
Major Modernization Plan, 1980]
.
The first of these is the recognition that many
maintenance tasks required for the FFG-7 can be estimated.
These maintenance actions have been combined into a
document called the Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) from which
all ships' maintenance availabilities will be planned. The
CMP relies upon feedback from the fleet to ensure that its
estimates are correct.
The second characteristic of the FFG-7 maintenance
strategy is that all intermediate and depot maintenance is
expected to be accomplished during more frequent availa-
bilities of three to four week duration rather than at
lengthy regular overhaul periods which last 6-12 months.
This concept, known as progressive overhaul, is expected
to keep the ship in a continually high rate of readiness
and should prevent any general material degradation.
22

The third characteristic of the FFG-7 maintenance
strategy is to make use of the CMP to anticipate equipment
failure so modular replacement can be scheduled prior to
the need for corrective maintenance.
The fourth and final characteristic is to make
use of repair-by-replacement rather than conventional
piece-part repair methods. This is designed to reduce
maintenance time for the ship, because it should be neces-
sary only to remove and replace (from a rotatable pool of
equipment) a component rather than remove, trouble-shoot,
repair, and reinstall. The trouble-shooting and repair
of the removed components should be accomplished at rework
sites ashore. Supporting this strategy, many of the ship's
systems have built-in test and fault detection/location
capabilities. Other design features include easy access
for installation and replacement and modular construction
for segmented removal. Further support for this strategy
is evidenced in the upgrading of the afloat and shore
intermediate maintenance activities (IMA) by providing:
(1) Skills—Eleven unique Navy Enlisted Classification
(NEC) codes will be assigned to all IMA's in the FFG-7
Class homeports; (2) Tools for hydraulic repair, micro-
electronic repair, hydraulic/electro-hydraulic/pneumatic
controls, battery charging and repair, expanded capabili-
ties in calibration, sensor, and testing, and fire control
system repair; (3) New test equipment; (4) Complete sets
23

of technical manuals and ship's plans on microfilm at each
IMA in FFG-7 homeports ; and (5) Deployment support in the
Mediterranean Sea which is planned to include a FFG-7
support group located in Naples, Italy, and civilian
personnel at Ship Repair Facilities (SRF) Subic Bay,
Philippines and Yokosuka, Japan who will receive training
in FFG-7 support [FFG-7 IMAV/SRA Major Modernization Plan,
1980J
.
4. Systems Training Concept
Training is also an area where the FFG-7 has had
an impact on traditional concepts. Each man is expected
to be able to perform his operational and maintenance tasks
when he reports for duty. To manage efficiently the
distribution of men possessing certain FFG-7 unique quali-
fications, 19 new Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC)
codes have been developed and approved. Eleven of these
NECs will also be assigned to IMAs . These billets have
been directed by CNO to be manned to both quality and
quantity. In addition, 67 billets should be manned to
quantity in the rating specified, but without regard to
pay grade. Deficiencies in pay grade and experience
levels in manning those 67 billets should be compensated
to the maximum extent possible through NEC training
pipelines [FFG-7 Class Maintenance Plan Doctrine, 1979].
The remaining 67 billets are to be manned in accordance
with fleet manning policy. This selective manning concept
24

described above applies to only conimissioning crews.
FFG-7 training pipelines are to be used to accommodate
replacement crews [FFG-7 Class Maintenance Plan Doctrine,
1979]
.
Because the ship class continues to evolve and
require new and/or additional skills, each of the ship's
departments is structured on a systems concept. The
system organization is based upon a progressive hierarchy
of skills and knowledge. The system is stratified into
the senior systems technician (SSTs), the senior enlisted
technician (SET), the subsystem technician, and subsystem
component technician, which include the apprentice tech-
nician. While this approach allows for orderly growth
and development of personnel, the application of the
system organization concept is predicated upon equipment
standardization among platforms and well-defined tactical
and managerial objectives for the class. This stratifica-
tion allows for the development of systems technicians in
pipelines that call for little or no personnel cross-
utilization or equipment cross-training [FFG-7 Class
Maintenance Plan Doctrine, 1979]
.
In ships of the FFG-7 Class only the combat systems
and engineering departments require senior systems tech-
nicians. Their responsibilities bridge traditional officer
management and strong technical experience. It is intended
that the SSTs perform their assigned duties without
25

supervision. The senior enlisted technicians are
specially selected individuals, pay grade E-6 and above,
whose qualifications are a combination of technical/
non-technical training and experience. It is intended
that the SET perform under supervision, however, the
functions of the SET in a department not having SSTs may
be expanded at the discretion of the division officer.
It should be noted that under current manning constraints,
individual billets may be filled one rating above or
below the rating specified in a ship's SMD. In the case
where less than an E-6 is available, he may be assigned
as the SET and be nominated for system-level training as
soon as possible.
A subsystem technician should be an individual
knowledgeable in all prescribed subsystem standards of
performance, modes of operation, subsystem alignment,
test procedures, documentations, and the designed inputs/
outputs of subsystem components. The individual should be
capable of directing and functionally integrating, under
supervision, all subsystem components through maintenance
tests and operational procedures to achieve performance
standards meeting design specifications. A subsystem-
component trained technician or apprentice technician
performs under supervision and should be knowledgeable in
all prescribed system components standards of performance,
modes of operation, test equipment, alignment, test
26

procedures, documentation, and the designed inputs/outputs
and functional relationships of all components [FFG-7
Class Maintenance Plan Doctrine, 1979].
5. Two-Year Leadship
A concept taken from the aviation community, and
applied to the FFG-7 Class acquisition program, is that of
"fly before buy." USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) can be
regarded as a prototype because of the two-year delay
between the completion of FFG-7 and the completion on the
next Class ship. To fully benefit from the "lessons learned"
a leadship should be commissioned four to five years ahead
of fellowships. Such a delay would be too long, however,
because fellowships could be obsolete before being commis-
sioned. There is more to the "fly before buy" concept
than merely the two-year delay. A major test and evaluation
program including the construction of two land-based test
sites was conducted. All major component systems were
tested independently before the first ship was finished.
A replica of the FFG-7 Class shipboard combat information
center (CIC) and radar equipment rooms were installed at
the combat systems land-based test site at Islip, New York.
Fully operational consoles, radars, antennae, and computers
were installed as in the original configuration. Only the
gun, missile launcher, and sonar systems were simulated.
The site conducted many trials prior to the systems being
placed aboard the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY. Similar trials were
27

conducted at the prototype plant of the gas turbine propul-
sion system at the Philadelphia division of the Naval Ship
Engineering Center. This land-based test site duplicated
the entire main propulsion gas turbines, reduction gear,
controllable pitch propeller, and propulsion control
system. Simulated missions were carried out using power
and speed profiles that would be expected in actual
operating conditions. The only parts missing are the
propeller blades. The Department of Defense now requires
that all major systems acquisitions be made on a "fly
before buy" basis [Beecher, 1978J
.
E . SUMMARY
The commissioning of the USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY
(FFG-7) took place on 17 December 1977 in Bath, Maine.
This ship represents a break with tradition (as described
earlier in this chapter) . How these constraints .and
concepts have impacted upon the Fleet and the "lessons




^^ III. SHIP MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
Determination of manpower requirements is an essential
function for our nation's armed services. Manpower and its
associated costs are among the many resources the armed
services must compete for within the federal budgetary and
allocation processes. To avoid inefficient manpower
resource allocations some appropriate methodology must be
devised and then utilized to determine manpower require-
ments. Historically, the United States Navy has relied
upon many years of experience and good judgment to serve
as the methodology for manpower requirements determination.
This methodology based upon experience and judgment became
more difficult to defend to those responsible for providing
the support of manpower requirements as more sophisticated
methods became available in civilian industry [Requirements
Determination Processes, undated].
The Ship Manpower Documentation (SMD) program was
initiated in 1966 to provide the methodology for manpower
requirements determination of the Navy's operating ships.
The SMD program, coupled with the Squadron Manpower Docu-
mentation (SQMD) program for aviation units, and the Shore
Requirements Standards and Manpower Planning (SHORSTAMPS)
will provide the means of determining the Navy's manpower
needs [Requirements Determination Processes, undated].
This chapter will focus on the SMD program for determining
29

the manpower requirements of our operating surface ships.
It will examine the methodology, assumptions, strengths
and weaknesses of the SMD methodology. Several alternative
methods of determining and estimating manpower requirements
for new, proposed, and existing ships will also be
examined. The OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Class and its
manpower requirements determination will be used as an
example for analysis of the SMD program and for some of
the other requirements determination methods.
A. SMD PROCESS
Manpower requirements determination and the SMD
methodology for that determination begin during the early
design phases of a ship acquisition program. The Ship
Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) from NAVSEA is assigned
the task of determining manpower requirements for his ship.
The SHAPM is able to request the preparation of the
Preliminary Ship Manning Document (PSMD) from several
sources; various contractors, the Personnel and Training
Analysis Office (PATAO) , or a division of NAVSEA. Regard-
less of the organization preparing the PSMD, it is
developed and presented in accordance with OPNAV lOP-23,
Guide to the Preparation of Ship Manning Documents ,
Volume I, Policy Statement [Betaque, Kennelly & Nauta,
1978] . OPNAV lOP-23 is the basic document for the SMD
process. It provides the rules, assumptions, and formats
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to be used in the formulation of all SMDs. The PSMD,
although always subject to review and revision, remains
in force until the SMD is approved for the operating ship.
Recommendations for authorization changes in the PSMD are
initiated by the SHAPM until the ship is commissioned, at
which time the Fleet Commander assumes his normal responsi-
bility and authority to recommend such changes [Betaque,
Kennelly & Nauta, 1978] . The Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Manpower Planning and Programming) , OP-11,
manages the SMD program and is responsible for the prepara-
tion of SMDs. In the case of PSMDs, however, OP-11 only
comments on and endorses those PSMDs submitted by the
SHAPMs to the CNO.
The formulation of an SMD to replace the PSMD begins
approximately one year after the ship is commissioned.
Specifically, the ship is scheduled for a manpower require-
ments survey team visit during the months immediately
following completion of the post shakedown availability
(PSA) . During the PSA, problems identified during the
shakedown and trials of the ship are corrected. After the
PSA, the equipment aboard the ship and the manpower require-
ments to operate and maintain them should remain somewhat
stable. The survey teams from the Navy Manpower and
Material Analysis Centers, Atlantic or Pacific
(NAVMMACLANT, NAVMMACPAC) , visit the ship in order to
determine manpower requirements in accordance with the
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standard SMD methodology. A draft SMD is subsequently
developed and forwarded to the ship and the chain of
command for review prior to an on-site review and publica-
tion as an OPNAV instruction [CNO (OP-124E) , undated].
This part of the SMD process is commonly referred to as
the validation of the PSMD. Final approval of an SMD
is by the DCNO (Manpower) , Ships are surveyed and SMDs
adjusted after the regular overhaul (ROH) . It is in the
ROH that modifications or equipment changes which affect
manpower requirements are likely to occur. The ships
are generally surveyed at the beginning of overhaul to
ensure inclusion of equipment and configuration changes.
This program for documenting ship manning requirements
during overhaul represents the second generation ship
manning document program or SMD II [Requirements Deter-
mination Processes, undated] . The SMD program also pro-
vides for interim changes to the SMD between overhauls
which are usually requested by the ship and submitted
through the operational chain of command to the fleet
commanders for approval.
1. SMD Terms and Assumptions
OPNAV lOP-23 and other reference publications
list and explain the terms and assumptions that are used
in the SMD program for manpower requirements determination.
Many of these assumptions also apply to the alternative
methods. Terms and assumptions germane to the Navy's
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manpower determination efforts will be discussed in this
section.
First, the SMD methodology assumes a readiness
condition I/condition III operating scenario. These
scenarios describe a wartime steaming situation during
which the ship is expected to perform all assigned tasks
in a three-section watch indefinitely, to be able to attain
full combat capability in condition I for periods of up to
24 hours, and to sustain condition III for an indefinite
period. All assigned maintenance is expected to be
accomplished in this scenario. The condition I/condition III
operating scenario assumption is made for all ships except
repair ships for which the SMD process assumes an inport
scenario.
The SMD process determines shipboard manning needs
based on the analysis of three functional requirements:
operational manning, maintenance manning, and own-unit
support. Operational manning is the qualitative and
quantitative sum of billets needed to man all operating
stations during a specified condition of readiness, such
as condition I or III. Statements of those capabilities
considered necessary for a ship to accomplish assigned
missions under various conditions of readiness are
contained in the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC)
and Projected Operational Environment (POE) developed for
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each ship type or class by the cognizant warfare sponsor
[CNO (OP-124E) , undated] . These statements from the
applicable ROC and POE assist the identification of the
operating stations which must be manned for the various
conditions of readiness. Maintenance manning reflects
the manpower needed to perform required preventive,
corrective, and facilities maintenance (housekeeping and
preservation) . Own unit support is the manpower needed
to perform administrative military, resupply, food service,
hygienic, and other service tasks in support of unit
personnel and equipment. The merging and summation of
these three areas results in the organizational manning
required for the ship. Organization manning constitutes
the level of manning adequate to attain full combat
capability in condition I, maintain condition III on a
minimum three-section watch basis at sea, and provide for
the accomplishment of ship's work in conditions III, IV
and V [Requirements Determination Processes, undated)
.
Maintenance manning, as determined by the SMD
methodology, is heavily dependent on the data and assump-
tions from the Maintenance and Material Management (3-M)
system and the Preventive Maintenance Subsystem (PMS)
program in particular. Preventive maintenance hours, which
account for scheduled maintenance workload, are taken and
summed directly from the Maintenance Requirements Cards
(MRCs) for each system, equipment, or component aboard
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[CNO (OP-124E) , undated] . The hours listed on the MRC
are the expected time that personnel of the appropriate
rating and NEC with a thorough knowledge of the system,
equipment, or component might require to perform the
maintenance action. The time, rating, and NEC required
for each maintenance action as well as how often mainte-
nance actions are required are determined by the manu-
facturer ' s maintenance requirements for the equipment
and Navy practices. PMS has a feedback opportunity for
operating forces to recommend changes to existing PMS
coverage. An allowance of 30 percent for Make Ready/
Put Away (MR/PA) time is added to MRC hours to obtain
total preventive maintenance hours required [CNO (OP-12 4E)
,
undated]
. This allowance is for the time required to
collect needed tools, don special protective clothing,
clean-up, put away tools, etc.
Corrective maintenance is the workload associated
with the restoration of disabled systems, equipments, or
components to an operational condition within predeter-
mined tolerances and limitations [CNO (OP-124E, undated]
.
The SMD methodology assumes that one hour of corrective
maintenance will be required for each two hours of
preventive maintenance. As an exception, in the case of
electronics-associated ratings one hour of corrective




Facilities Maintenance is the workload associated
with performance of maintenance to preserve the hull,
superstructure, and all equipments against corrosion or
deterioration and to maintain cleanliness [Naval Sea
Systems Command, 1975] . Facilities maintenance workload
is primarily a function of area to be preserved and
cleaned, and the anticipated frequency of such actions.
OPNAV 10P23 states that the facilities maintenance man-
hour requirements per unit of work are computed on the
basis of work sampling data. Frequencies for these
facilities maintenance actions are determined by Navy
custom and engineering judgment.
A productivity allowance factor of 20 percent is
applied to the maintenance manning requirements and other
productive work requirements other than the operational
manning of watchstations. This allowance is a rough
estimate of the delays caused by fatigue, environmental
effects, personal needs, and other unavoidable interrup-
tions which increase the time required to accomplish work
[CNO (OP-124E) , undated]
.
Allowances are also made in the SMD process for
service diversions and training requirements. Service
diversions as defined for SMD use are those actions required
of personnel by regulations or the nature of shipboard
routine which must be, or are normally, accomplished
during normal off-watch working hours, and which therefore
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deduct from individual capacity to do productive work.
The following types of activities are representative of
service diversions: quarters, inspections, sick call,
pay line, haircuts, business at post of f ice, ship * s store,
personnel office, disbursing office, etc.
Training, for purposes of SMD development, is
defined as activity of a practical or instructional
nature which contributes directly to combat readiness or
personnel effectiveness, but which otherwise detracts
from individual capacity to accomplish productive work.
The three categories of training normally considered
during SMD development are formal training, proficiency
training, and drills and practices. SMD methodology
combines service diversions and training into a single
allowance figure which is 6.00 hours per week for non-
watchstanders and 4.5 hours per week for watchstanders.
It should be reemphasized at this point that the service
diversion and training allowance as well as all other SMD
allowances assume a condition I/III scenario. Present
peacetime underway condition IV and inport condition V
enable and require much greater time and emphasis to be
placed on the training of crews and individuals. Service
diversion time also tends to expand during periods of
condition IV and V.
After completion of determination of operational,
maintenance, and own unit support manning, and after adding
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the various allowances by work center for the ship, the
number of billets required is computed by dividing the
total man-hours required by the appropriate Navy standard
workweek. These workweeks are 66.0 hours for non-




SMD methodology does not provide for measuring or
defining the functional workload for officers. The number
of officers assigned and their functions are largely
determined by fiat.
2. PSMD for FFG-7
The manpower requirements determination and develop-
ment of the PSMD was conducted in accordance with established
SMD methodology for the most part. At various phases of
the process, however, provisions were made to account for
some of the FFG-7 unique concepts designed to minimize
manning requirements of the Class. These concepts were
delineated in Chapter II of this thesis.
The initial estimate of manning requirements
conducted during the preliminary concept phase of the FFG-7
project utilized a computer-based model, the Manpower
Determination Model (MDM) . Manning estimates using MDM
for various system and subsystem configurations ranged
from 220 to 256 personnel. A manning baseline of 220
officers and enlisted personnel was adopted [Nauta, 1978]
.
During the design phases of the FFG-7 project, further
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manning estimates were made ranging from an "austere"
manning level of 213 to an MDM estimate of 231 based on
an updated ship's equipment list. Citing the requirement
to bring followship production costs below target, CNO
reduced the accommodations to 185 [Nauta, 1978] . With a
five percent growth margin, this set a manning ceiling of
176 officers and enlisted personnel, including the LAMPS
aviation detachment. Given the CNO's ceiling on accom-
modations and manning, SHAPM started the development of
the PSMD by tasking the Naval Personnel Research and
Development Laboratory (NPRDL) to prepare a PSMD in
accordance with the standard SMD methodology early in
1972. SHAPM also tasked Navy Manpower Programs Support
Activity (NMPSA) to prepare a manning estimate. The PSMD
presented by NPRDL identified 184 required officer and
enlisted billets, while NMPSA returned a manning estimate
of 213 [Nauta, 1978J . The manning constraint of 176
remained through the commissioning of the OLIVER HAZARD
PERRY. The PSMD reflected the ceiling constraint for the
first time late in 1972. Subject to constant review, the
PSMD received minor revisions, but the total manning
requirement was unchanged through commissioning of the
leadship. Changes to the PSMD and proposed changes after
that event will be discussed in the next chapter. It was
the difference between the manpower requirements estimates
and the imposed manning constraints that required the
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SHAPM to investigate alternatives to reduce the manpower
required for the ship class [Nauta, 1978] . These alter-
natives later became the FFG-7 concepts such as reduced
bridge manning due to increased cross-utilization training
(proposed Ship Controlman rating) , and the Class Maintenance
Plan with its progressive overhaul and modular replacement
programs [Link, 1980]
.
The above concepts, and other factors, caused the
formulation of the FFG-7 PSMD to be slightly different
than those for more traditionally manned ships. Preventive
maintenance manning requirements are based upon the quantity
and quality of manpower identified by the PM subsystem of
the 3-M system. The requirements are summed from the data
on MRCs for all equipment. FFG-7 contained many new
equipments and received "worst case" substitution Mainte-
nance Index Page (MIP) requirements as the basis for
substitution. Where equipments were not covered by PMS
the "worst case" substitution was represented by the most
demanding maintenance requirements presented due to
equipment specifications and reliability.
The PSMD development for FFG-7 adhered to accepted
SMD methodology except where deviation was required to
conform with the minimum manning concepts of the ship
project. The early estimates of manning requirements
conformed with SMD methodology, but did not account for
the minimum manning concepts of utilization of ship
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controlmen to man bridge watchstations, centralization
of administrative and supply functions, use of a dedicated
deck force for facilities maintenance, and implementation
of a class maintenance plan to reduce maintenance manning
requirements . Much of the difference between PSMD manning
and early manning estimates appear to be the result of
manning reductions made possible by these minimum manning
practices. Precise comparison is not possible due to the
implementation, partial implementation, and non-
implementation of the various minimum manning concepts
proposed for FFG-7 and assumed in PSMD development.
B. VALIDATION PHASE
1. NAVMMACLANT Procedures
The Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center
(NAVMMACLANT AND NAVMMACPAC) are tasked by CNO to validate
all ship manning requirements and prepare a final SMD to
replace the PSMD. The validation includes facilities
maintenance (FM)
,
preventive maintenance (PM) , corrective
maintenance (CM) , own unit support (OUS) , and watch-
stations [Royce, 1980].
The on-site validation is carried out by a team of
five to eight people who interview supervisors on-board
the ship. FM data is gathered by using OPNAV form
1000/28(12-79) (Table III). The only input the ships'



























POLISH GLASS (Both Sides)
(10 SqFt)
Each .0808
?OLISH GLASS (Sm Portholes) Each .0162
iMTT TRASH CONTAINER Each .0671
SWEEP SqFt .0002
SWAB SqFt .0003
SWEEP LADDER (10 Steps) Each .0236
SCRUB DECK SqFt .0008
SCRUB DECK GRATINGS SqFt .0098
SWEEP DECK RUBBER MAT SqFt .0003
STRIP AND RE-WAX SqFt .0010
*AX AND BUFF SqFt .0010
VACUUM CARPET SqFt .0003






























CLEAN BRIGHT WORK LinFt .03A9
CLEAN DEEP SINK Each .0468
CLEAN LIGHT FIXTURES Each .0178
CLEAN i DISINFECT URINALS Each .0441
CLEAN & DISINFECT COMODES Each .0519
CLEAN WASH BASINS Each .0378
CLEAN (. DISINFECT SHOWERS Each .0519
CLEAN MIRRORS Each .0013
CLEAN RAILS & STANCHIONS LinFt .0047
CLEAN MACHINERY SURFACE SqFt .0070
PAINT MACHINERY SURFACE SqFt .0170
PAINT DECK SqFt .0071
PAINT BULKHEAD SqFt .0082



























CHIP PAINT (Hand) SqFC .3334
CHIP PAINT (Machine) SqFC .1333
WIRE BRUSHING SqFC .0480
DUST OR BLOW DOWN & SPOT
WIPE OVERHEAD
SqFt .0011
WIPE DOWN CABLE RUNS LlnFt .0023
WIPE DOWN PIPES LinFt .0023
SPOT WASH (Bulkhds/Overhds) SqFC .0045
DUST DESKS Each .0098
DUST FILE CABINETS Each .004 3
, _., ..
DUST EQUIPMENT (CABINETS) Each .0097
DUST BOOKCASES Each .0193




CONVERSION FACTOR FREQUENCY TABLE
6.0 - Every day (6 day work week) D6 - 6 Times per day
7.0 Every day (7 day work week) D Daily
3.5 - Every other day M2 - Twice per week
2.0 » Twice per week M Monthly
1.0 Weekly M2 = Twice monthly
.445 =• Twice monchly Q - Quarterly
.231 - Monchly S Semi-,annually
.154 - Twice quarterly A Annually
.077 - Quarterly C Cycle




SECONDS - HOURS MINUTES HOURS MINUTES HOURS MINUTES HOURS
10 .003 11 .184 27 .450 43 .717
15 .004 12 .200 28 .467 44 .734
30 .008 13 .217 29 .484 45 .750
43 .013 14 .236 30 .500 46 .767
60 .017 15 .250 31 .517 47 .783
MINUTES HOURS 16 .268 32 .534 48 .800
1 .017 17 .283 33 .550 49 .817
2 .033 18 .300 34 .564 50 .830
3 .050 19 .317 35 .584 51 .350
4 .067 20 .333 36' .600 52 .867
5 .084 21 .350 37 .617 53 .884
6 .100 22 .367 38 .634 54 .900
7 .117 23 .384 39 .650 55 .917
8 .134 24 .400 40 .667 56 .934
9 .150 25 .417 41 .684 57 .950








PM is validated by taking the number of man-hours required
for each system, equipment, or component onboard as
listed on the maintenance requirement card (MRC) . To
this figure a 30 percent make ready and put away allowance
and 20 percent productivity factor are added. CM is
calculated by using a ratio of one hour CM for every two
hours of PM, with the exception of electronics which uses
a 1:1 ratio. OUS hours are computed on the basis of work
sampling data using Table IV. The following areas are
considered OUS: (1) administrative support, (2) command
support, (3) supply support, (4) medical support, and
(5) utility tasks and evolutions. Watchstation require-
ments are validated by surveying operational manning
requirements as compared to the ROC/POE. Service diversion
and training are also figured in using established allow-
ances of 6.00 hours weekly for non-watchstanders and 4.50
hours weekly for watchstanders . These allowances are for
condition III steaming. Upon completion of the on-site
review, the workload is calculated for each work center
and the number of billets required are computed by dividing
the productive man-hours available per week by the appro-
priate Navy standard workweek. The quality of the billets
is determined by: (1) pay grade and NEC assigned by the
Navy's 3-M (maintenance and material management) system,
(2) watchstation qualifications as specified by the
Personnel Qualification System (PQS)
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by the NEC manual, and (4) pay grade distribution necessary
to meet rating community flow considerations as determined
by Chief of Naval Personnel [CNO (0P-12E) , undated] . The
total ship manning requirements and those of each work
center are then computed using the NMRS computer models.
Although standard SMD methodology and assumptions
as well as NMRS are employed in the formulation of a PSMD
and its validation by NAVMMAC survey teams significantly
different results can be obtained. These differences
stem from many sources. Equipments, systems and missions
can be changed in the time between PSMD development and
validation. Fleet policies for maintenance and watch-
stations are subject to revision. Reliability and
operating requirements of new equipment can frequently
be incongruent with those that were anticipated during
PSMD development.
New ships with significant new equipment configura-
tions and manning concepts present more opportunity for
variance between PSMD and validation survey requirements.
NAVMMAC survey teams can interpret procedures differently
and adhere more strictly to published Navy policies than
do the writers of the PSMD who can be more conscious of
the concepts which may be unique to the new ship project
[Betaque, Kennelly & Nauta, 1978].
2. FFG-7 Validation Survey
The FFG-7 and its PSMD validation serves as an
example of differences which can arise between PSMD and
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SMD requirements. NAVMMACLANT conducted an on-site valida-
tion of the PSMD for the FFG-7 at Mayport, Florida
16-20 October, 1978. Based on this survey and further
guidance from CNO, NAVMMACLANT prepared a draft SMD for
FFG-7 dated 21 June 1979. This draft SMD sets manning
requirements at 188 enlisted personnel; an increase of 36
above original PSMD requirements [Royse, 1980]. Some of
the recommendations, discussion, and guidance concerning
the development of the draft SMD for FFG-7 are contained
in the correspondence between CNO and NAVMMACLANT as shown
in Appendices A, B, C, and D.
The draft SMD is currently under review and subject
to change before final SMD release, preventing the analysis
of final SMD and PSMD requirements differences. The
recommended requirements changes in the draft SMD include
additions to various ratings and divisions due to higher
than anticipated workloads. Addition of a postal clerk,
a master-at-arms, and a 3-M coordinator are also included
in draft SMD recommendations [Royse, 1980].
The manning requirements of the draft SMD reflect
major changes to concepts used in PSMD development for
engineering and bridge watchstanding during condition III.
The draft SMD requires four additional watchstations
during condition III in these areas.
Two additional engineering department watchstanders
are required in the draft SMD at condition III. These
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watchstanders man the forward and after auxiliary machinery
rooms (Appendix A) . These machinery rooms were designed
to be unmanned. The FFG-7, in condition III operations,
manned these two watchstations. The watches also served
as fire, flooding, and security watches on a roving basis
[Pacek, 1980] . The authors* opinion is that these watch-
standers were added primarily as a backup to the automatic
sensors and operators. Our experience and training has
been that automatic devices cannot be fully trusted and
that personnel must check them. Electrical and mechanical
devices and sensors do fail and become inoperable. On
occasions when automatic equipment is not operational the
ship will probably be forced to add additional watchstanders
to operate and monitor systems which are in a manual mode.
The ship controlman rating has not been approved
for FFG-7. This has created the requirement to either
formalize the specialized training required or increase
billets to allow sufficient personnel to perform the
required watch functions (Appendix A) . The draft SMD
requested a net change of one additional enlisted watch-
station and a JOOD to be either an officer or a chief
petty officer (Appendix B)
.
Subsequent review of the draft SMD has recommended
elimination of the additional bridge watchstander
(Appendix D) . These watchstation changes, coupled with
the addition of one watchstation in the combat information
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center at condition III provide an operational manning
increase of 12 to 15 watchstanding billets.
C. METHODS OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS COMPUTATION
Several Navy-developed and contractor-developed
approaches for improving the Navy's manpower requirements
determination have been introduced in recent years.
Current SMD methodology incorporates the use of the Navy
Manpower Requirement System (NMRS) . NMRS was instituted
on 1 April 1978 to replace the Computerized Ship Manning
Analysis (CSMA) system for the production of SMDs [Concept
for Optimizing SMD, undated] . NMRS and other alternative
methodologies for manpower requirements determination will
briefly be examined, contrasted, and compared in the
following section.
1. Manpower Determination Model (MDM)
The MDM was developed in 1967 by the NAVSEC for
the purpose of generating ship manning estimates early in
the design process utilizing fleet manning data for similar
systems/subsystems as proposed for the new ship [Nauta,
1978] . MDM is the method currently used to estimate
manning requirements for proposed ship projects. The MDM
was originated because the standard SMD methodology was
considered too detailed to make manning estimates early in
the design phases of a shipbuilding project. MDM utilizes
a data base of 7,000 basic modules representing various
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equipments, systems, subsystems and ship characteristics.
Data are available for DD, FF, DDG, DLG, DLGN, LPA, LKA,
AE, AF, AFS, AO, AOE, AOR, MCS, CVA, and CVAN Class ships
[Plato, 1975] . The user then chooses a package of modules
based on anticipated equipment packages and ship charac-
teristics. This would be modules containing the desired
type of ship and its manning requirements coupled with
anticipated engineering, weapons, and sensor packages,
etc. MDM computes billets required in accordance with
standard SMD methodology; using standard allowances,
standard workweek, maintenance ratios, etc. Manning
requirements are established for each readiness condition.
The model then computes a total manning package by com-
paring the manning requirements for each condition of
readiness and ensuring full utilization of each billet.
The MDM data base also includes provisions for deter-
mining austere as well as conventional manning estimates.
Checks against actual ships have indicated MDM has an
accuracy of ±5% [Plato, 1975] . This accuracy is in terms
of required numbers of personnel only. MDM does not
accurately estimate the grade and skill level require-
ments [Betaque, Kennelly & Nauta, 1978]. The FFG-7
example shows that the MDM estimate of 213 is not within
five percent of manning as reflected in the PSMD. The




2 . Navy Manpower Requirements System (NMRS)
The NMRS is the approved system to be used in
developing manning documents for ships and aviation units.
The computer-based model computes manning requirements
for SMD generation as described earlier in this chapter.
Through analysis of manning requirements in the operational,
maintenance and own unit support areas at various condi-
tions of readiness, the system generates required billets
to: 1) minimize the number of billets, 2) minimize
paygrades, 3) minimize NECs, 4) assure assignment of each
work and watch requirement to a qualified billet, and
5) assign billet titles [NMRS Functional Overview, 1979] .
The NMRS computer programs do have some flexibility to
conduct sensitivity analysis. Variables such as work week,
productivity allowance, service diversion and training and
make ready/put away allowances may be adjusted. SMD
generation, however, requires all variables be adjusted to
comply with the standard SMD allowances and workweek.
Criticism of the NMRS method is usually focused
upon the data base assumptions. Validation of the work-
loads and allowances used has been sparse. A validation
study conducted by NAVMMACPAC in 1978 indicated that the
PM and CM data ratios used in SMD formulation were not
totally valid. The study results were that: 1) PM require-
ments were frequently overstated, 2) more CM manhours were
consumed than used in the SMD program, 3) PM:CM ratios
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varied by rating and ship class, and 4) the study found
no apparent mathematical relationship between PM and CM
that would predict CM when PM is varied. When the data
from the study were used in the SMD process, the SMD
manpower implications were positive and negative—the
number of billets for some ratings increased while others
decreased. However, when compared with the billets
authorized by the OPNAV 1000/2, the data almost uniformly
indicated increases were necessary if all workload and
watch requirements were to be satisfied [NAVMMACPAC, 1978].
The NMRS program has also been criticized as being
a static approach to manpower determination. NMRS deter-
mines manning according to conditions of readiness without
regard to actual anticipated operating schedules.
The most commonly touted alternatives to the NMRS
program share many of the features of NMRS. These
similarities and differences will be identified for the
alternative systems.
3 . Tiger/Manning
Tiger is the NAVSEA reliability/maintainability
projection model built and operated by NAVSEA. It utilizes
mean time between failure and mean time to repair data
bases to predict corrective maintenance requirements.
The TIGER/MANNING model derives manning requirements based
upon corrective maintenance workload. The model mathe-
matically estimates reliability, readiness, and availability
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of systems based on the following types of input data:
mission data, repair policy, equipment failure data,
spares provisioning data, system configuration, and
equipment operating rules [Betaque, Kennelly & Nauta, 1978]
.
The model allows the user to study the effects of corrective
maintenance manpower on system reliability, readiness,
and availability. Although the Tiger/Manning model can
schedule repairmen to stand watch, it does not provide for
all required watchstations to be manned [TIGER Manual,
1980] . The model is able to predict utilization of repair
personnel and corrective maintenance personnel requirements
assuming exponential distributions of both mean time
between failure and mean time to repair for various equip-
ments and systems [Betaque, Kennelly & Nauta, 1978]
.
Because the Tiger model estimates only corrective main-
tenance manning requirements, it would appear it has only
limited applications for the development of manpower
requirements for new ships. The data base could possibly
provide, however, a better estimate of corrective main-
tenance requirements than the PM:CM ratios used currently
in SMD development.
4 . Presearch and Tidewater
Presearch, Inc. and Tidewater Consultants, Inc.
each were contracted to develop improved approaches to the
SMD system as part of the Navy's Maintenance System
Development Project (MSDP) . This project is managed by
PMS 306, an office of the Naval Sea Systems Command.
61

The approach developed by Presearch attempts to
make the NMRS more dynamic. A Ship Additional Determina-
tion and Analysis Module (SHIP ADAM) is used as an adjunct
to the NMRS [Technical Comparison, undated] . The process
of determining manning requirements starts with the NMRS-
generated SMD manpower and imposes a peacetime operational
schedule scenario upon the modelled ship. The program
allows for and computes idle time and deferred workload
by work center as the ship moves through its schedule
[Technical Comparison, undated] . Work is deferred based
upon priorities inputted by the user. The deferred work
is manipulated as necessary to obtain the minimum manning
required to accomplish all work.
The Tidewater Consultant approach also depends
heavily on NMRS. The Tidewater system also seeks to deter-
mine manning requirements for a ship under a typical
peacetime operating scenario. The Tidewater approach is
similar to the Presearch method. The Tidewater approach
seeks to minimize billets based upon changing needs to
have idle time and deferred work at various periods during
operations. This system is computationally simpler than
the Presearch method in that it uses a weighted averaging
technique of multiplying workload in a given operating
condition of readiness by the percentage of the operational
shcedule spent in that condition [Technical Comparison,
undated] . The Tidewater system used no major data
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collection effort. Data are obtained from the NMRS and
other existing data bases.
D. SUMMARY
The accuracy of any manpower requirements determination
model is difficult to evaluate. The currently used method
is approved by the Navy. It has flaws and weaknesses.
The alternative methods which have been presented attempt
to solve some of the problems with the current SMD program.
None of them appears to be the perfect solution. Most of
the Navy's efforts to improve the system still rely on the
validity of SMD allowances and ratios. The NAVMMACPAC
validation study of PM and CM manning indicated the PM
assumptions and the PM:CM ratio are not valid. More work
must be done in the area of va2»idation of allowance and
ratio values if any method is to reflect accurately the
manpower needs of the Navy's ships.
The NMRS model program can be adjusted to allow for
different values of the many variables which are now pre-
determined in SMD formulation. CM manning data can be
obtained from the Tiger data base as well as from 3-M
reporting data. NAVMMACLANT/PAC survey teams are equipped
with the expertise to validate many of the other allowances
and assumptions. Accurate reappraisal of CM requirements,
PM requirements, PM:CM ratios and allowances would enhance
the overall performance of the SMD program.
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IV. FFG-7 CLASS FUTURE
This chapter is divided into three sections. The
first is concerned with the current status of the FFG-7
Class and many of the original FFG-7 concepts. The
second section shows the impact of advanced technology
on the experience mix of the Navy's personnel force. The
demand for higher quality and experienced personnel could
force policy changes away from a reliance on a youthful
force. The third section addresses the Navy's efforts to
obtain a balance between hardware and manpower trade-offs.
We will focus primarily on the Navy's project entitled
Military Manpower versus Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN)
and its efforts to improve the trade-off balance.
A. CURRENT STATUS
1, Design Constraints
The original ship acquisition plan called for a
total of 50 FFG-7 Class ships to be acquired between 1973
and 1979. However, due to concern about the' concurrency
of leadship and fellowship construction, early in the
program the schedule was stretched-out to provide a two-
year gap between delivery of the leadship and the first
fellowship [Nauta, 1978]
.
Other changes in the procurement program were
caused by the CNO decision to increase the number obtained
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from 50 to 68, and Congressional reductions in ship
construction authorizations and appropriations caused a
delay in the procurement timetable. Currently, the program
is scheduled for completion in 1988 with the FFG-7 Class
then comprising 20 percent of the Navy's surface ships.
Due to these changes, the acquisition cost goal of
$45 million (FY73) dollars for each fellowship has increased
to $68 million (FY73) dollars [Beecher, 1978].
The Navy was also unable to remain within the
original displacement or accommodations constraints. The
displacement goal was 3,400 tons, but the FFG-7 has a
displacement of 3,645 tons. The CNO originally established
185 accommodations as the limit for the FFG-7 Class.
Currently 30 additional bunks are being installed, at the
expense of habitability [Nauta, 1978] , onto the FFG-7 Class
in accordance with the schedule delineated in Chapter II
of this thesis. The original design constraints were not
met; without these constraints the design of the FFG-7
Class may have grown to the extent that it would not have
been acceptable to purchase the Class [Beecher, 1978]
.
2. Ship Controlman Rating
The design constraints were not the only items not
achieved on the FFG-7. Many of her manning concepts were
not approved. The development of the ship control rating
which would have combined the functional duties and know-
ledge of the quartermaster, signalman, and boatswain mate
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ratings was disapproved. This presents the Class with a
problem of either training all new quartermasters, signal-
men, and boatswain mates in the complex tasks required
during FFG-7 Class bridge watches, or traditionally manning




Another concept that is running into difficulty is
the Class Maintenance Plan (CMP). This is basically an
educational problem. The FFG-7 Class is an exception to
all other ships when it comes to maintenance. The Inter-
mediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) and the Ship Repair
Activities (SRAs) have to treat this Class differently
from any other ship. The minimum manning concept of this
Class causes a great deal of maintenance to be scheduled
for other-than-ship' s force [FFG-7/IMAV/SRA Major Moderniza-
tion Plan, 1980]
.
Although not part of the CMP, the FFG-7 's first
Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMAV) illustrated
that a greater level of management is needed during the
first few availabilities to ensure material is expedited
and procedures are carefully monitored and controlled. A
future problem may also be the availability of personnel
in the specific NECs needed to support the maintenance
program for the FFG-7 Class at the IMAs due to the training
pipeline required for these personnel. Other problems
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could occur if tools, test equipment, and technical
manuals are not supplied to the IMAs and other support
groups [FFG-7 IMAV/SRA Major Modernization Plan, 1980]
.
4 . Manning
When the FFG-7 Class was initially designed, it
was expected that the ships would be priority manned.
(Priority manning means the ship would be assigned its
full complement of fully trained personnel as outlined in
the SMD.) It was felt priority manning was needed because
the PSMD of the FFG-7 was developed at the minimum manned
level [Nauta, 1978] . However, the CNO determined it was
not possible to priority man the FFG-7 Class, so in the
FFG-7 's Plan for Use the CNO called for selectively manning
the Class to both quality and quantity. This selective
manning concept is detailed in Chapter II of this thesis.
It should be pointed out that this selective manning is
only for commissioning crews and that later crews will be
subject to fleet manning policy [FFG-7 Class Maintenance
Plan Doctrine, 197 9].
Priority manning is generally authorized for new
construction units for the first year, deployed units, and
submarines [Bentaque, Kennelly, & Nauta, 1978] . The
FFG-7 Class is an example of new construction units no
longer receiving complete priority manning. These new
ships, which are now manned against NMP (Navy Manning Plan)
have critical quantitative skill deficiencies between
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design manpower and actual on-board personnel and are
experiencing difficulties in their post commissioning
phase activities [COMNAVSURFLANT, March, 1980].
The manning deficiencies, which manifest them-
selves as persisting problems in the subsequent years of
the ship's life cycle, originate prior to completion of
construction. The Navy Training Plan (NTP) prescribed
for each new ship has shown a downward migration in
quantity and quality of rates assigned. Additionally,
assigned personnel frequently arrive on-board late and
often without the requisite skills [COMNAVSURFLANT, March,
1980] . The personnel being assigned are also not being
as carefully screened, as they were in the past, for
disciplinary or administrative problems thus causing ships
to bear these problems as well as difficult commissioning
work-up tasks {COMNAVSURFLANT, March 198 0] . The FFG-7
Class is experiencing these problems as the Navy is unable
to fill billet requirements in accordance with crew
phasing and planning documents [Fleet Introduction Team,
Bath, Maine, Jan. 1980].
In June, 1977 the prospective Commanding Officer
(CO.) of USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) addressed the
problems of additional manpower requirements for the FFG-7
in a letter to the Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM)
for the FFG-7 Class (PMS-399) . In reviewing FFG-7 manning,
with the goal of ensuring adequate operator and maintenance
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manpower for existing and add-on equipments without
compromising the minimum manning philosophy, the prospective
CO. arrived at justification for 28 additional billets
[Prospective CO., 1977] .
While not directly responding to the prospective
C.O.'s letter, manning authorizations have been increased
for the FFG-7 Class. In recognition of the Class's
sensitivity to unprogrammed personnel shortfalls in both
quality and quantity, the CNO has authorized 16 qualifica-
tion and training billets for each FFG-7 Class ship.
These billets reflect a 10.5 percent increase above the
current PSMD level of 152 enlisted billets. These added
billets allow a continuing qualification period to accom-
modate a normal crew turnover. These personnel are to be
assigned to the ship for training, watch qualification,
and for reassignment to fill urgent unplanned losses
[COMNAVSURFLANT, Jan, 1980]. If because of the addition
of these billets onboard manning exceeds berthing capacity,
the CO. will have the option of selecting personnel to
be transferred on a temporary basis to an afloat or shore
command. In the case of deployment, excess personnel could
be assigned temporary duty functions in the area and at
the halfway mark in the deployment report to the deployed
ship. The replaced personnel are then sent ashore for
temporary duty until the ship returns to its homeport
[COMNAVSURFLANT, Sept. 1978] .
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In addition, because of feedback from COMNAVSURFLANT
and NAVMMACLANT ' s recommendations (based on a manpower
survey visit of the FFG-7 16-20 Oct., 1978), CNO has
programmed an additional 20 enlisted billets for the
FFG-7 Class in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for
fiscal year 1981. These 20 billets seek to minimize the
impact of unforecasted losses, provide upward mobility,
and provide flexibility in accomplishing unscheduled
corrective and facilities maintenance [Bruce, 1979]
.
This manpower growth consists of increasing funded billets
to 189 enlisted, which breaks down to 173 enlisted plus
16 qualification and training billets [CNO, 1980] . The
bunk alteration for an additional 30 bunks as described
in Chapter II will increase enlisted accommodations to a
total of 198 bunks and therefore be able to handle the
increased manpower.
The Navy currently mans its ships according to the
Navy Manning Plan (NMP) . The NMP allows for the manning
of ships based upon the actual total number of Navy
personnel available worldwide as well as the individual
ship requirements as specified in the SMD or PSMD.
Generally, the number of personnel available in the man-
power pool for NMP assignment is somewhat less than the
SMD requirements to operate the ship [Bentaque, Kennelly,
& Nauta, 1978]. The developers of FFG-7 Class had
requested priority manning for the Class for its entire
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life-span but did not obtain it. The methodology used in
developing the FFG-7 PSMD arrived at a minimum figure of
152 enlisted personnel. The developers felt that the
figure could not be further reduced. The loss of priority
manning means that the Class will receive only its "fair
share" of available personnel assets. The authors there-
fore believe that the increase in billets above the
original 152 serves to increase the chances of the ship
being actually manned to original PSMD levels under the
NMP. Information garnered from interviews conducted in
the Washington, D.C. and Norfolk, Va. areas was interpreted
by the authors as revealing that 152 was a sufficient
number of personnel to successfully operate the ship.
5. Capabilities
The FFG-7 Class has multi-mission capability
similar "in-range" to a traditional DD/DDG; however,
capability is limited "in depth" in many mission areas.
These constraints are imbedded in hardware, organization,
and manning of the ship [Mann, 1979] . It is the opinion
of the authors that the FFG-7 Class is a capable class of
ships which can be employed in convoys, battle groups,
etc. However, the FFG-7 Class should not be required to
escort an aircraft carrier and act as the plane guard
ship. The FFG-7 Class has limitations that should be
adhered to so the commanding officer is not placed into
a "can do" or "must do" environment.
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The Fleet must understand the exceptions of the
FFG-7 Class. With the minimum-manned bridge, the FFG-7
Class cannot handle the typical two communication nets,
maneuvering board, tactical publications, challenge and
reply, visual signalling, and the daily routines all at
once. If the Fleet recognizes this as a fact, then the
bridge manning can be reduced. If, on the other hand,
the Fleet requires the bridge of the FFG-7 to perform the
same as those of the DD-963 orDDG-2, then additional man-
power will be required on the bridge [Mann, 1979] .
One final area of Fleet education, in regards to
the FFG-7 Class, must be mentioned. The FFG-7 's "push as
much paper" as other ships. Inspectors come aboard
expecting the same results as they would on a DD-963 or
FF-1052 Class—each one of those Classes having more
personnel than the FFG-7 to devote to the administrative
workload. For example, in an FF-1052 Class ship, condition
III engineering watchstations drive a total of nine senior
petty officers and chief petty officers billets who are
available inport to administrate and manage division/
work center PQS (Personnel Qualification System) , PMS
(Planned Maintenance System) , and other requirements which
are not measured in the SMD methodology. With fewer
condition III watchstations, the FFG-7 Class does not have
these senior personnel available; however the same
administrative/management programs are required. This is
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counter to the minimum manning concept since "pushing
paper" does not increase combat capability. The "peacetime"
management of administrative and support requirements
needs to allow the FFG-7s to be an exception to a portion
of this sort of workload rquired of other ships [Mann,
1979]
.
B. MILITARY EXPERIENCE LEVEL
1. Manning Comparison
The FFG-7 Class Project office (PMS 399) conducted
a study in January, 19 8 providing comparisons among the
manning of the five most recently delivered destroyer-type
ships. Their results in terms of billet quality and
quantity are shown in Table V [PMS 399, 1980].
The numbers in Table V were obtained from the
ships' SMDs or PSMDs. The figures indicate that while all
of these new destroyer-type ships are petty officer
intensive, the FFG-8 has the highest percentage (69.5) of
E-4 and above personnel. It should be noted that the
numbers for the FFG-8 do not include the 16 qualification
and training billets (all E-4 or above) , or the 2 POM-81
recommended billets (6 E-2/3s and 13 E-4 or above) . Also
not included in Table V are the helicopter (LAMPS) detach-
ment billets or those personnel who will be required upon
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Binkin and Kyriakopoulous [197 9] have pointed out
that the military forces of today are primarily youth-
oriented and each year the armed forces are the nation's
largest single employer of youth. They point to several
factors that constitute the basis for this heavy reliance
on youth. First, the military has traditionally set a
premium on "youth and vigor," largely on the grounds that
military occupations demand high levels of physical fit-
ness. Second, the military personnel management system,
geared to a traditional pyramidal rank structure, has
shaped a force characterized by a high rate of turnover.
This is often referred to as the "up or out" concept.
This has created a requirement for large numbers of young
people, who by and large are not expected to serve beyond
one enlistment period. Third, a youthful force has long
been considered a less expensive force (a draft philosophy)
Fourth, the practice of cycling many of the nation's youth
through the active military forces enlarges the mobiliza-
tion base by providing a source of manpower for U.S.
reserve components. Finally, a military system in which
a large number of youngsters serve temporarily has also
been measured in terms of its benefits for society.
These factors listed above seem to contradict the
trend of the newly developed ships, listed in Table V,
that call for many highly technical experienced personnel.
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The aviation community has also experienced a rise in
demand for skilled labor. For example: the F-15 program
procured highly sophisticated automatic test equipment
to do the fault diagnosis of avionic boxes and sub-
assemblies. These test stations go down on the average
of every 34 operating hours, and because of their
complexity, 50 percent of the failures experienced have
never occurred before. The learning curve is flat, it
takes 5 to 6 years of on-the-job training (OJT) and
experience to become proficient in operating these
stations. The Air Force has hired contractors and
government service employees to assist the military main-
tenance personnel [Shorey, 1980] . The impact of a youth-
ful policy, combined with low retention, can be evidenced
by examining the experience shortfalls of the FFG-11 shown
in Table VI [COMDESRON TWELVE, 1980].
Table VI
FFG-11 Experience Shortfalls
Billet Number Rate Allowed Paygrade Alla^/ed Paygrade Assigned
E-221 MR E-5 E-3
CS-303 FT E-6 E-3
CS-304 FT E-5 E-1
CS-307 FT E-4 E-1
CS-309 FT E-4 E-2




If the Navy hopes to keep pace with technology,
it is evident it needs to rely on skilled, experienced
specialists and technicians. One of the by-products of
the advancements in technology is extensive training
programs. In its fiscal 1979 budget, the Department of
Defense requested $5.9 billion dollars to operate its
training establishment. An example of the high cost of
billets due to increased training requirements can be
seen from Table VII [PMS 399, 1980].
Table VII













The FFG-8 data do not include the cost of the 16
qualification and training billets, the 20 additional
billets recommended in POM-81, or the helicopter (LAMPS)
detachment. It also does not consider the cost of
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training shore personnel to adequately support the Class
as dictated by the Class Maintenance Plan. The high
costs indicated in Table VII increase if personnel are
not retained and replacements are required [PMS 399, 1980]
C. HARDWARE VERSUS MANPOWER
In 1976 the Senate Armed Services Committee requested
the Secretary of the Navy to evaluate and improve the
integration of planning, requirements determination,
training, allocation, and assignment of military civilian
and reserve manpower in the Navy. With the rising cost
of manpower, the Senate desires to ensure that manpower
is affordable and available during the design of any new
system [Watkins, 1977].
1. HARDMAN
In response to this request, the "Military Man-
power versus Hardware Procurement Study" (HARDMAN) was
initiated. The study was to analyze compatability of
the manpower and training requirements determination
functions within the Weapons System Acquisition Process
(WSAP) [CNO, 1978].
The HARDMAN Study found that: (1) Plans and
analysis for manpower and training occurred too late in
the WSAP; (2) WSAP directives and instructions do not
provide systematic policies for manpower and training
consideration (65 directives); (3) Deficiencies exist in
the development of training plans needed to support a
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new system (80% are late and 25% were unfunded in POM-78)
;
(4) Project managers and principal development activities
require greater incentives to address manpower issues; and
(5) Analytical tools are required to conduct tradeoff
analysis [Watkins, 1977].
In response to these findings the CNO established
the HARDMAN project office (OP-112) . This office is to
develop a program that will institutionalize the require-
ment to consider the manpower and training impacts on the
WSAP [CNO, 1978] . As a part of the HARDMAN process
development, Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC) was
contracted to develop a prototype version of the HARDMAN
methodology for assessing manpower and training require-
ments. The prototype methodology has five major steps:
(1) establish a consolidated data base; (2) perform man-
power requirements analysis; (3) perform personnel/training
requirements analysis; (4) conduct impact analyses; and
(5) determine potential trade-off areas and repeat the
methodology. This prototype methodology has been applied
to the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS)
and the LSD-41 propulsion system. In order to be fully
evaluated more applications of this prototype methodology
are required [Dynamics Research Corporation, 1979] .
The HARDMAN office is currently involved in a
series of meetings designed to both inform the larger
manpower and hardware communities about the progress of
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the HARDMAN project and to solicit feedback and support
of exploratory concepts which will be pursued in the
future by the HARDMAN office. These meetings hopefully
will provoke communication between manpower and hardware
experts. Then a process can be devised which early on
identifies the manpower problems in today's systems and
the systems on the drawing board, the manpower implica-
tions of the design changes, and manpower costs now and
in the future [Sovereign, 1980]
.
2. Other Efforts
In addition to the efforts of HARDMAN, several
weapons systems projects have the consideration of the
impact of their proposed systems upon manpower and
training requirements among their objectives. The F-18
and the F-16 aircrafts, the Pershing II (a medium range
ground-to-ground missile system) , Patriot (a high and
medium altitude air defense system) , and AEGIS (an air
surveillance and defense system) have attempted to reduce
or constrain maintenance manpower requirements in numbers
and skill [Shorey, 1980].
Weapon system programs can affect manpower savings
through a combination of three different approaches. One
approach is to reduce the frequency of maintenance demands
through the use of improved materials, higher reliability
components, and design simplification. A second approach
is to reduce the task times and skill requirements for
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maintenance actions by: (a) improving accessibility,
(b) making troubleshooting easier through automated and
built-in test equipment, (c) improved technical manuals,
and (d) training. Finally, new support concepts, such as
the elimination of maintenance levels or consolidation
of repair at centralized points, can lead to significant
manpower savings [Shorey, 1980]
.
It is too early in the development of these
systems to determine if their program efforts have been
fully successful. There are still problems in these
programs such as the lack of techniques which can relate
measured results to manpower attributes, and a lack of
measures of manpower effectiveness. Despite these
problems, the recognition by the designers of new weapons
systems that manpower is a problem is a step in the right
direction [Shorey, 1980].
D. SUMMARY
The first portion of this chapter discusses the
problems encountered by the FFG-7 in regards to its design
concepts. The second and third sections address the
problem of advancing technology and manpower and training
requirements. The increase in the quality and cost of
personnel due to advanced technology have caused the Navy
to establish the HARDMAN project office in an attempt to
establish a process where manpower and training require-
ments are considered early in the WSAP . The Navy can no
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longer enjoy the luxury of assuming that its manpower
and training requirements can be satisfied from inexhaustible
resources at an acceptable cost. Practically every WSAP
decision has manpower, personnel, and training implications.
Manpower related costs are the single most significant
requirement on the Navy's resources [CNO, 1978].
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY {FFG-7) was commissioned in
December of 1977. The ship is the leadship for the FFG-7
Class destroyer. The total number of ships to be pro-
cured for this Class has fluctuated, but 68 are currently
planned. When completed in 1988, the FFG-7 Class will
comprise 20 percent of the total number of the Navy's
surface ships.
A. CONCEPTS
There are many unique aspects of the FFG-7 program
which distinguish it from traditional ship programs. The
FFG-7 design constraints, its organization, mission and




The Perry (FFG-7) Class was the first design-
to-cost ship acquisition program. The design-to-cost
process is similar to the earlier design-to-requirements
program, but cost is recognized as a design parameter in
the design-to-cost system. Cost goals are established
early during the ship design and are subjected to trade-
offs with schedule and performance. The FFG-7 was designed
with a construction cost goal of $45.7 million and a limit
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of $50 million in fiscal year 1973 dollars. Since the
leadship (FFG-7) has been built the cost for each fellow-
ship in the Class has increased to $68 million (fiscal
year 1973) dollars.
b. Displacement
The FFG-7 displacement goal was the second
major design constraint. In order to remain within the
$45 million goal, the CNO set a displacement goal of
3,400 tons and a limit of 3,600 tons fully loaded. While
the FFG-7 exceeded this goal (3,645 tons), without a
displacement goal it may have risen to an unacceptable
level.
c. Accommodations
Cost again played an important role in deter-
mining the number of accommodations on the FFG-7 Class
ships. The CNO directed that there would be 185 bunks in
order to reduce life cycle costs, particularly manpower.
The FFG-7 leadship experience has caused 30 additional
bunks to be added to the ships of this Class. This addi-
tion is at the expense of designed crew habitability
.
The bunk alteration will be conducted as delineated in
Chapter II of this thesis.
2. Organization
a. Departments/Divisions
The FFG-7 Class varies from tradition in the
organization of its departments. Unlike the traditional
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frigate the FFG-7 has the following departments:
(1) combat systems; (2) ship control/communications;
(3) support; (4) aviation; and (5) engineering. The only
officers assigned to the ship control/communications, and
support departments are the department heads. The role
of the division officer is assumed by the senior enlisted
petty officer in each division. The FFG-7 deck division
also has its differences from tradition. Personnel in
this division stand no underway watches. The facilities
maintenance (FM) program onboard increases deck division's
responsibility to include the cleanliness and maintenance
of all topside and common-use spaces,
b. Watchstations
Design technology has enabled the designers to
reduce the number of condition III watchstations. In the
engineering department most propulsion, electrical, and
damage control equipment is started and operated by a two-
man watch in the central engineering control station.
Advanced technology has also led to the elimination of the
requirement for watchstations in the auxiliary machinery
spaces. However, the need for watchstations in the auxi-
liary machinery spaces for security and safety reasons
is still being discussed and no decision has been made
(See Appendices) . Another issue currently under discussion
is the number of personnel ijequired during the FFG-7
condition III bridge watch. Designers, in an attempt to
reduce the number of bridge watchstations from the
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traditional 11 or 13 enlisted personnel and two officers
to one officer and five enlisted personnel, developed a
ship controlman rating. This rating would combine the
functional duties and knowledge of the quartermaster,
signalman, and boatswain mate ratings. This new rating
was disapproved by the Navy. The exact number of personnel




Each of the ship's departments is structured
on a system training concept. The system is stratified
into the senior systems technician, the senior enlisted
technician, the subsystem technician, and subsystem
component technician, which includes the apprentice
technician. This stratification allows for the develop-
ment of technicians in pipelines that call for little, or
no personnel cross-utilization or equipment cross-training.
3. Mission and Characteristics
The FFG-7 Class was built to help provide the level
of escort capability required in the 1980 's and beyond.
The FFG-7 Class was part of a shipbuilding concept which
will provide a spectrum of ships. The DD-963 Class were
designed to be small in number but very capable ships
operating in high threat areas. The FFG-7 Class, on the
other hand, was to be smaller, but still effective,
lower cost and be used for less demanding tasks. For
example, the DD-963 Class is designed for escorting
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aircraft carriers while FFG-7 Class is designed for
escorting underway replenishment groups, amphibious
forces, and commercial shipping to protect them against
subsurface, air, and surface threats.
The Perry Class is a gas-turbine powered, single-
screw guided missile frigate comparable in size to the
FFG-1 Class, but manned by a smaller crew. A list of
the ship characteristics is given in Table I. In addi-
tion, there are already plans to retrofit the Class with
more advanced technical equipment.
4 . Maintenance
The Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) for the FFG-7
includes several unique characteristics. The first of
these is the recognition that the requirements for many
maintenance tasks can be estimated. These estimates
form the schedule for all ship's maintenance availabilities
The second characteristic is that all intermediate and
depot maintenance is expected to be accomplished during
more frequent availabilities of three to four week
duration (progressive overhaul) rather than at lengthy
regular overhaul periods which last from 6-12 months.
The third characteristic makes use of the CMP to
anticipate equipment failure so modular replacement can
be scheduled prior to the need for corrective maintenance.
The fourth characteristic is to make use of repair-by-
replacement rather than conventional piece-part repair
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methods. Because of the FFG-7 being a two-year lead-
ship, the CMP has not been completely implemented or
tested.
5 . Manning
The FFG-7 was designed for the minimum amount
of personnel required. It was expected that the ship
would be priority manned. Priority manning means the ship
would be assigned its full complement of fully trained
personnel as outlined in the SMD. Instead the CNO called
for selectively manning the FFG-7 Class. Nineteen new
FFG-7 unique NECs have been directed by the CNO to be
manned to both quality and quantity. In addition, 67
billets should be manned to quantity in the rating
specified, but without regard to pay grade. The remaining
67 billets are to be manned in accordance with fleet
manning policy. This selective manning concept described
above applies to only commissioning crews and later crews
will be subject to fleet manning policy.
In recognition of the FFG-7 Class's sensitivity
to unprogrammed personnel shortfalls in both quality and
quantity, the CNO has authorized an additional 16 qualifica-
tion and training billets for each FFG-7 Class ship.
These personnel are to be assigned to the ship for
training, watch qualification, and for reassignment to
fill urgent unplanned losses. Feedback from COMNAVSURFLANT
and NAVMMACLANT (based upon the FFG-7 leadhsip experience)
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has caused the CNO to program an additional 20 enlisted
billets for the FFG-7 Class in POM-81.
The Navy currently mans its ships according to
the Navy Manning Plan (NMP) . The NMP allows for the
manning of ships based upon the actual total number of
Navy personnel available worldwide as well as the individual
ship requirements as specified in the SMD or PSMD. The
original PSMD of the FFG-7 called for 152 enlisted billets.
Increasing the number of authorized enlisted billets to
18 9, the authors believe, serves to increase the chances
of the ship being manned at minimum level under the NMP.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Policy Alternatives for Skilled Personnel
The minimum manning concept for the FFG-7 Class
produces a large demand for highly skilled personnel both
on the ships and in the shore establishments. In our
opinion, there are several alternatives that could be
developed to meet this demand.
a. Civilianization
Civilianization of shore billets is one action
to support the maintenance programs and fill the unique
NECs required for the FFG-7 Class. There are two sources
of civilian labor: (1) direct-hire employees of DoD,
and (2) contract hires, who work for private-sector firms
under contract to DoD [Beltramo, 1974] . A cost-
effectiveness study is required to determine if either one
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of these sources of manpower is feasible. Binkin,
Kanter, and Clark [1978] list the costs that should be
considered in such a study. These civilians could free
the NEC trained military man for sea duty.
b. Lateral-entry
Another possible area for policy change is
lateral-entry into the military from the civilian world.
This would eliminate much of the skill training from the
military. It would also enable the military to recruit
to fill shortages in specific rates and NECs.
c. "Up or Out" Policy
The Navy's "up or out" policy also eliminates
some highly skilled personnel. The "up or out" policy
requires personnel to advance to supervisory roles and
increased responsbility, or leave the service. Some
technicians do not desire to be supervisors or accept the
increased responsibility. The loss of these technicians
hinders the Navy's efforts to fill technical ratings to
both quantity and quality.
d. Proficiency Pay
It costs the Navy a good deal of money to
train personnel with technical NECs. If these personnel
depart the military has to recruit and train a replacement.
The money spent for these replacements should be used
to pay a proficiency salary, bonus, or other benefits to
highly skilled workers. This increase in pay or benefits
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would lessen the lure of civilian companies with large
payroll promises.
2 . FFG-7 Class Improvements
a. Priority Manning
The authors feel the FFG-7 Class should have
received priority manning rather than selective manning.
The designers were faced with constraints in cost, displace-
ment, and accommodations. One of their assumptions was
that the Class would receive priority manning. Using this
assumption, the designers developed the ship with the
minimum amount of personnel required. If the FFG-7 Class
had received priority manning, perhaps the need for the
16 qualification and training billets and 20 additional
billets requested in POM-81 would not exist.
b. Ship Controlman Rating
The designers of the FFG-7 Class, working
under the minimum manning concept, reduced the number of
personnel required in condition III bridge watches. In
reducing the quantity of personnel on watch, the quality
of those remaining was assumed to increase. The ship
controlman rating would have combined the functional
duties of the quartermaster, signalman, and boatswain
mate ratings. The authors feel that the ship controlman
rating should be approved. If not, at least a new NEC
should be developed that would train personnel in the
quartermaster, signalman, and boatswain mate ratings.
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The FFG-7 should not be required to have a traditional
bridge watch.
c. Class Maintenance Plan (CMP)
The FFG-7 CMP requires this Class of ship to
be treated differently from other ships by the IMAs and
SRAs. Based on the experience of the leadship of the
Class, the authors believe a greater level of management
is needed to ensure material is expedited and procedures
are carefully monitored and controlled. In our opinion,
it is also essential that the support activities receive
the necessary skilled personnel, tools, test equipment,
and technical manuals in order to make the CMP a success.
It is also assumed that sufficient spares are purchased,
and that the operating scenarios will return the ships
regularly to shore-based or tender maintenance facilities.
3. HARDMAN
The authors agree with the concepts of the HARDMAN
project office. A program is needed to fully consider the
manpower and training impacts on the WSAP . Perhaps if the
HARDMAN prototype methodology had been used on the FFG^7
Class the need for 16 qualification and training billets;
30 additional bunks; and the need for the 20 proposed
growth billets would have been recognized early in the
design of the system. Procedures to establish communica-
tion between manpower and hardware experts, not just a
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review process, are needed. Communication forums (similar
to the Hardware-Manpower trade-offs meeting of 12-13 March,
1980) , are necessary to exchange information between hard-
ware and manpower communities. Some of the appropriate
Naval communities are: (1) all Deputy Chiefs of Naval
Operations (DCNOs) ; NAVMMAC (Atlantic and Pacific) ; Naval
Personnel (NAVPERS) ; Navy Education and Training (NET)
;
Commanders/Atlantic and Pacific fleets) ; and 3-M personnel.
4. SMD Recommendations
a. Condition III
When developing a SMD, it is assumed that
wartime cruising (Condition III) is the most manpower
demanding condition. The authors would also like to see
the manning requirements by in-port workload (Condition V)
determined. Because of the limited availability of some
personnel in-port (due to leave, liberty, etc.), it would
be prudent to identify deferred workload and assign it to
the off-shore support units as necessary.
b. PM:CM Ratio
The authors feel from their experience and
research that the PM:CM ratio used in the SMD process is
not a true reflection of workloads required by CM and PM.
In our opinion, CM should be an independently calculated
workload element rather than one derived from PM. This
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will require expansion of data collection in order to
establish a CM data base. Some of the data required
may be found in the Tiger CM and 3-M data bases.
c. Other Allowances
The prescribed allowances for service diversion and
training are about one-half the ten to twelve hours per
week fleet commanders say are required [Bentaque, Kennelly,
& Nauta, 1978] . This allowance and the others used in
the SMD process, need to be reevaluated. Validation of
these allowances and assumptions will enhance the








From: Commanding Officer, Navy Manpower and Material
Analysis Center, Atlantic
To; Chief of Naval Operations (OP-11)
Subj : USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Preliminary Ship
Manpower Document (PSMD) Validation; preliminary
report of
Ref: (a) CNO Itr Ser 124E/695524 of 25 May 1978
(b) PSMD for FFG-7
(c) Conversation between LCDR SANEK, NAVMMACLANT,
and CDR LIVINGSTON, CPlllCl of 24 Oct 1978
End: (1) Problems and Recommendations
1. Pursuant to reference (a) , the on-site phase of the
validation of the PSMD for USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7)
,
reference (b) , was conducted at Mayport, Florida during the
period 16-20 October 1978. During the on-site review, the
survey team identified a number of problems or perceived
problems in the PSMD which can be addressed effectively
while a revised draft SMD is still under development. In
response to a request conveyed in reference (c) , enclosure
(1) contains a description of these problems, together with
recommendations for their resolution.
2. Several of the deficiencies discussed in enclosure (1)
have a common basis. The ship was designed for reduced
manning of the ship control function on the premise that a
new rating. Ship Controlman, would be established. Since
the proposed rating has not been approved, the billets
provided for the enlisted bridge watch team are a mixture
of SM, QM and seaman billets the incumbents of which, in
this ship, have had extensive cross-training prior to the
commissioning of the ship. There is a requirement either
to institutionalize such training for future crews or to
provide additional billets which will afford the necessary








1. Problem . The PSMD does not provide for a JOOD at
Condition III; however, a JOOD is considered necessary.
a. Discussion . The ship control console lacks compo-
nents to allow a one-officer watch on the bridge. Design
features lacking in the console include collision-avoidance/
computer-associated radar, adequate all-around visibility,
and integrated navigational equipment, which is located
around the bridge in a similar fashion to non-minimum
manned ship bridges. Additionally, the signal bridge,
bridge, CIC, communication and display design is felt to
be unsatisfactory for managing/maintaining a tactical
picture from CIC.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that the JOOD
watch be manned at Condition III; E-7 is considered to be
the minimum pay grade required.
2. Problem . The Navy does not have a program to provide
the necessary training for the seamen required for bridge
watches on the FFG-7.
a. Discussion . Due to the disapproval of the ship
controlman rating concept, the ship requires a formal
training pipeline to ensure that seamen standing bridge
watches are qualified to rotate through the bridge watch
stations, which requires them to be capable of operating
the integrated bridge console. While SM is considered
the minimum qualification, the SN can attend formal QM and
SM training to indoctrinate him in his duties. A possible
alternative to the proposed ship controlman rating would
be to establish an NEC to identify the unique training
requirements for that SN. A less desirable alternative
would be to man the bridge with a traditional watch which
would drive three additional billets. This is not desirable
because of the reduced-manning concept of the FFG-7 design.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that a formal
training pipeline and an NEC, vice rating, be established.
If this is not feasible, then a traditional bridge watch
is recommended.
3. Problem. The PSMD does not provide for a POOW at
Condition III; however, a POOW is considered necessary.
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a. Discussion . A nonrotating enlisted watch super-
visor is required to maintain the deck log, compass log,
weather log, the drafting of weather messages, omega
navigation and D/R plotting in addition to supervising and
administering to the routine needs of the enlisted watch
section.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that the POOW
be manned at Condition III; aQMl/Sl/lI is considered to be
the minimum requirement.
4. Problem . The PSMD does not provide for an Assistant
Visual Communicator/Messenger; however, the watch station
is considered necessary.
a. Discussion . Due to the restricted open bridge
visibility and unsatisfactory design of the "signal shack"
within the ship control area an assistant visual communicator
is considered necessary to perform the duties associated
with wartime steaming visual communications in a Condition
III environment. By combining the duties of bridge
messenger with the assistant visual communicator it is
felt a savings of three billets can be realized.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that the
Assistant Visual Communicator/Messenger be manned with a
SMSN.
5. Problem. The PSMD does not provide for a billet in
the unmanned equipment room; however, a billet is required.
a. Discussion . The ship is not equipped with remote
systems status indicators in CIC for its sophisticated
electronics equipment. Due to the mission essentiality
of the OJ-172/UYK, AM/UYK/20, MK-92 Servo control cabinet,
AIMS MX XII IFF, AN/SPS-49 and the cooling water systems,
a Data System Casualty Control/System Monitoring Operator
is required at Condition III.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that a Data
Systems Casualty Control/System Monitoring Operator be
manned at Condition III with a DS2 minimum requirement.
6. Problem . The PSMD does not provide for a Forward
Equipment Operator/Monitor; however, one is considered
necessary.
a. Discussion . A Forward Equipment Operator is
required to monitor, start, stop and shift machinery in
auxiliary machinery rooms #1 and #2. He is also a fire,
flooding and security watch. The equipment located in #1
97

and #2 auxiliary machine rooms includes reefer plants,
freeze boxes, chill boxes, SSDG auxiliary fuel transfer
system, A/C plants, fire pumps, HP/LP air compressors
and educator systems.
b. Recommendat ion . It is recommended that the
Forward Equipment Operator/Monitor be manned at Condition
III with an ENFN minimum.
7. Problem. The PSMD does not provide for an After
Equipment Operator/Monitor, however, one is considered
necessary.
a. Discussion . An After Equipment Operator/Monitor
is required to monitor, start, stop and shift machinery
in the engine room and auxiliary machinery room #3. He
also acts as a fire, flooding and security watch. The
equipment he is responsible for includes the gas turbines,
reduction gear, lube oil purifier, CHT system, main lube
oil system, SSDG, distilling plants, HP/LP air compressors,
and eductor system.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that the After
Equipment Operator/Monitor be manned at Condition III with
an ENS minimum.
8. Problem . The PSMD does not provide for a Postal Clerk
to maintain the ship^s post office.
a. Discussion . The functional workload associated
with the maintenance and operation of the post office is
sufficient to warrant the assignment of a permanent PC3
to the ship. The assignment of this workload to a YN
de-emphasizes the strict management control of the PC
requirements and further detracts from the available man-
power assigned for administrative support in the central
office complex concept of reduced manning.
b. Recommendation . It is recommended that a PCS
be assigned to the ship to administer the mail and maintain
the postal duties.
9. Problem . Consideration has been given to the proposi-
tion that a CICWO might be necessary at Condition III,
although one is not provided in the PSMD.
a. Discussion . The PSMD displays billets for a TAO
and CIC supervisor. A CICWO billet filled at Condition
III would allow the TAO to devote his full attention to
weapons system employment without detraction from his
duties required in the supervision of the CIC watch section
duties involving TG communications, station-keeping
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recommendations and surface contact picture for bridge
team assistance.
b. Recommendation . It is not recommended that the
CICWO be manned at Condition III. The assignment of a
TAO and CIC watch supervisor eliminates any functional
workload or supervision requirement for another billet in
CIC. The manning of these two billets is adequate to
fulfill the ship's requirements until Condition I is
required, at which time the CICWO is also manned.
10. Problem . Consideration has been given to the proposi-
tion that a 61JS sound-powered phone talker may be required
at Condition III, although one is not provided in the PSMD.
a. Discussion . The sonar stack operator can not
function on watch while wearing sound-powered phones. A
61JS phone talker is therefore required to pass sonar
contact information to the bridge and CIC.
b. Recommendation . It is not recommended that a 61JS
sound-powered phone talker be manned at Condition III,
a 29MC foot-operated microphone with speakers on the bridge
and in CIC is available for passing sonar contact informa-







From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commanding Officer, Navy Manpower and Material
Analysis Center, Atlantic
Subj : USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Preliminary Ship
Manpower Document (PSMD) Validation; guidance
concerning
Ref: (a) CO NAVMMACLANT Itr 7T:1272/cm 5310 ser 1823/7
of 15 Nov 1978
1. Reference (a) addressed ten areas of concern with the
FFG-7 PSMD, identified during NAVMMACLANT ' s on-site
survey/validation of USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7),
considered to be of sufficient gravity to warrant CNO
guidance before the development of a draft SMD.
2. Each problem area has been reviewed by CNO and the
following comments/guidance are provided and keyed to
the recommendations as set forth in enclosure (1) to
reference (a)
:
-1- CONDITION III JOOD : The watch is valid, however,
it is to be manned by a ship's company officer.
-2, 3, 4- ENLISTED BRIDGE WATCH REQUIREMENTS : To
alleviate this problem an additional watch station has
been identified. The following is a list of valid
Condition III enlisted bridge watch stations (minimum




- Ship Control Console (SCO Operator (SN)
Signal Supervisor (SMSN)
Messenger/Recorder (SN)
- Port Lookout (SN)
Starboard Lookout (SN)
The additional watch station should provide for
a QMOW/POOW and provide flexibility to rotate on watch
personnel. No NEC will be assigned SC-1 personnel.
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-5- CONDITION III DATA SYSTEMS CASUALTY CONTROL/
SYSTEM MONITORING OPERATOR WATCHI This watch is not
considered to be a valid watch station requirement.
-6, 7- CONDITION III EQUIPMENT OPERATOR/MONITOR
WATCH (FORWARD AND AFT) ; These are valid watch stations
and should be identified in the draft SMD. Minimum
requirements are forward (ENFN) , aft (GSM3)
.
-8- PC3 BILLET : This is a valid requirement to be
identified in the draft SMD.
-9- CONDITION III CICWO ; This is not a valid require-
ment, however, in order to allow the CIC watch supervisor
to provide his full attention to his supervisory duties
an additional OS watch station (ASAC) is considered to be
a valid requirement. The following is a list of valid
enlisted Condition III CIC watch stations (minimum require-
ment indicated in parentheses)
:
Station
CIC watch supervisor (OSl)
- ASAC (0S2)
Surface detector/tracker (OSSN)
- Air detector/tracker (OSSN)
- DRT Operator (OSSN)
-10- CONDITION III 61JS TALKER ; This is not deemed
to be a valid requirement.
3. The above information should resolve those FFG-7 PSMD
problems raised as a result of the on-site validation.
Accordingly, it is anticipated that the FFG-7 draft SMD








From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commanding Officer, Navy Manpower and Material
Analysis Center, Atlantic
Sub j : USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Ship Manpower
Document (SMD)
Ref: (a) Draft SMD for USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7)
of 21 Jun 1979
(b) USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Draft SMD
On-site Review Conference of 13 Dec 1979
1. The in-depth review of reference (a) identified
several areas in which the validity of the initial
NAVMMACLANT documentation effort was contested by
FLT/TYCOM staff and ship representatives (reference (b)
refers) . Based on the comments of review conference
attendees, the following major issues and deficiencies
in reference (a) were identified:
a. Planned Maintenance System (PMS) requirements
have been reduced significantly from that contained in
the PMS package used to develop the draft SMD.
b. Utilization of ratios (Planned Maintenance (PM)
to Corrective Maintenance (CM) ) to derive CM manpower
requirements is an illogical procedure in view of the
availability of CM data for the entire ship.
c. Ship departmental and repair party organizations
reflected in reference (a) are not in conformance with
the organizations contained in CNO's FFG 7 "Plan for Use",
OPNAVINST C9000.4, and the FLT/TYCOM approved Battle
Organization Manual for FFG 7 class ships.
d. Five divisions (Ship Control, Communications,
Deck, S-1 and S-2) do not have division officers assigned.
Required administrative and command support workload
normally performed by a division officer is therefore
assigned to the senior enlisted billet in the division.
This workload is not documented by the draft SMD.
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e. Minimum rate requirement for the Console Operator
Watch during Condition III should be E-4 vice E-3.
f. Staffing of the Ship Control Division is deemed to
be inadequate to accomplish the assigned workload because
billets in the draft SMD do not provide minimum qualitative
requirements to perform all bridge functions properly. For
example, documentation of SN vice QMSN/SMSN billets does
not provide a sufficient number of properly trained
personnel for periodic relief/rotation of bridge watches
within a watch section.
g. E8/9 rather than E6 ship 3M Coordinator is required
due to the maintenance management responsibilities
associated with the billet.
h. Visual signal watch can be adequately maintained by
one (1) SM assisted by other on-watch personnel when
required, therefore the necessity of recorder watch at
Condition III is questionable.
i. CPO (E-7) staffing in the DC/AUX Division is
viewed as excessive with three CPOs (EMC, HTC and ENC)
assigned.
j. Manning the after Battle Dressing Station with a
Medical Technician (HN) is considered invalid. Requirement
can supposedly be met by an individual properly trained in
routine first aid.
3. In order to provide precise manpower documentation for
the ship, survey of and/or validation of workload data
associated with the aforementioned areas is deemed necessary
It is requested that this tasking be completed not later
than 15 February 1980. Issues/workload which cannot be
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CNO Itr ser lllCl/678531 dtd 14 Jan 80
USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Draft SMD
On-site Review Conference of 13 Dec 79
Draft SMD for USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7)
dtd 21 Jun 79 (NOTAL)
OPNAVINST C9000.4 (FFG-7 Plan for Use) (NOTAL)
COMNAVSEASYSCOM Itr ser 1354 dtd 15 Sep 7 5
(FFG-7 Class Ship-Preliminary SMD) (NOTAL)
CO, NAVMMACLANT Itr ser 1823/7 dtd 15 Nov 78
(NOTAL)
CNO Itr ser lllCl/272261 dtd 4 Jun 79 (NOTAL)
OPNAVINST 3120.32
NAVPERS 18068D, Navy Enlisted Occupational
Standards, Section I, Change 5, Jan 7 9
CNO SMDGRAM 7 5-9 dtd 20 Mar 7 5 (NOTAL)
SMDLANT 78-35 dtd 26 SEP 78 (NOTAL)
OPNAVINST C3 501. XXX (Draft POE/ROC for the
FFG-7 Class Ship) (NOTAL)
1. Reference (a) tasked this command to revalidate
selected workload data associated with the FFG-7 class
ship. This tasking was generated as a result of reference
(b) which followed FLT/TYCOM staff and ship review of
reference (c) , the draft SMD. The revalidation has been
completed; the following recommendations are provided and
keyed to the issues as set forth in paragraph 1 to
reference (a)
:
a. Planned Maintenance System (PMS) requirements for
the FFG-7 class ship were made available in December 1979
and thus not incorporated in reference (c) when written.
They will be incorporated in the final SMD for this ship




b. With regard to utilization of Planned Maintenance
(PM) /Corrective Maintenance (CM) ratios, it is recommended
that the use of the ratio for Planned Maintenance (PM) to
Corrective Maintenance (CM) be retained for the following
reasons:
(1) As a result of two on-site validation efforts,
it has been determined that all CM carried out on the
ship is not being fully reported, and what is being
reported, is unfortunately not in a form suitable for
use in SMD development. This data is forwarded to
COMNAVSEASYSCOM (PMS 39 9) for application to equipment
reliability and does not detail who actually performed
the CM. Although the CM can usually be identified
with a particular work center, in most cases it cannot
be identified with a particular rating when the work
center contains multiple ratings, or to a particular
rate within a rating.
(2) The documented CM does not represent a normal
period in the lifecycle of a ship. On-site validation
has confirmed that a substantial amount of CM is
associated with correcting initial design deficiencies
which are unique to new construction ships, and should
be non-recurring.
It is therefore recommended the PM/CM ratio continue
to be used until completion of the present effort by
COMNAVSEASYSCOM to establish an independent functional
workload standard for CM.
c. The ship's departmental organization will be
changed to reflect incorporation of reference (d) which
was not originally distributed to this command.
Reference (c) was initially developed displaying ship
organization as reviewed in on-site validations. Issue
(c) also indicates that the repair party organizations are
not in conformance with the organizations contained in the
FLT/TYCOM Battle Organization Manual for FFG-7 class ships,
The Battle Organization Manual for this class has not been
approved but is in a draft status. It is recommended that
the repair parties identified in an approved FLT/TYCOM
Battle Organization Manual be incorporated in the final
SMD.
d. Administrative and command support workload
relative to enlisted personnel performing Division Officer
duties cannot be validated by originator at this time.
The problem is compounded because required Division
Officer workload has not been defined for any condition of
readiness. On Perry, collateral duties that are
105

traditionally assigned to Division Officers have been
divided among the department heads and senior enlisted
personnel in the Ship Control and Supply Departments.
Although the workload associated with some of these
collateral duties can be substantial, the responsibility
for accomplishment of this work cannot arbitrarily be
assigned at the Division Officer level, since the majority
of collateral duties have no particular minimum required
skill level. It is further questionable whether a large
number of the traditional collateral duties could be
considered valid Condition III work elements.
Issue (d) is therefore referred to CNO (OP-111) for
resolution. In order to help define the assignment of
administrative and command support workload to enlisted
Division Officers, it is recommended that the ship FM/OUS
Data Base Manager be tasked to identify collateral duties
that are considered to be valid for a Condition III
environment and to establish a minimum skill level for
each.
There is one other problem area associated with the
three enlisted division officers assigned to the Ship
Control Department (BM, RM, AND QM rates) . Reference (f )
,
based on the first Perry on-site validation in October
1978, recommended this Condition III JOOD watch be added
with a minimum skill level of E-7. Reference (g) approved
this watch, upgrading the skill level to a commissioned
officer, although at the time, the ship's current manpower
authorization did not include sufficient officer billets
to support this watch. During reference (c) , COMNAVSURFLANT
concurred in the need for this watch, asking it to be
identified as an officer/CPO requirement. Since SMD
methodology only assigns the minimum required skill to a
watch station, originator will recommend, by separate
correspondence, that this watch station be formally
approved, with a minimum skill level of E-7. In actual
practice. Perry is using the three Ship Control Department
enlisted division officers to fill this watch requirement.
This watch requirement, on top of the dual hat of enlisted
Division Officer/senior enlisted billet, is excessive,
since SMD methodology normally assigns 30 hours/week of
Own Unit Support to the senior enlisted billet in each
rate, and the additional 56 hours/week for a Condition III
watch exceeds the Standard Navy workload of 74 hours/week
for a Condition III watchstander . If the Condition III
JOOD watch is approved at a skill level of E-7, it is
recommended that this watch be assigned in the final SMD
to a QMC, BMC, and RMC, and that the staffing tables for
these three rates be modified for the FFG-7 to ensure that
the second senior enlisted billet in these rates be at
least an E-6, to ensure adequate division supervision.
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e, f, and h.
The FFG-7 Ship Control Department was initially
designed to have a Ship Control Division that would be
responsible for fulfilling all bridge and visual conununica-
tions Condition III watch requirements. It would be
staffed with personnel possessing a new Ship Controlman
rating encompassing both QM and SM training. The Ship
Controlman rating, relevant NEC, and/or training pipeline
for this function has not been established. The physical
arrangement of the ship control spaces on Perry prohibits
a traditional bridge watch. Reference (e) proposed five
Condition III watches for this ship: ship control console
operator, a visual communicator, a communications recorder,
and two lookouts. As initially intended, all five of
these watches would be Ship Controlmen, which would meet
minimum watch station requirements, and allow for the
required bridge watch rotation in accordance with reference
(h) . Since the Ship Controlman rating concept has not
been implemented, or a training pipeline established to
support the unique bridge watch station requirements of
the FFG-7, an attempt was made to man these stations
with traditional rates. In accordance with normal SMD
methodology, minimum skill levels for these watches are
as follows:
Ship Control Console Operator - Undefined
Visual Communicator - SMSN
Lookouts (2) - SN
Communications Recorder - SN
The Ship Control Console operator replaces the following
watches on a traditional bridge:
Minimum Requirement
Helmsman SN
Engine Order Telegraph Operator SN
Talker (1 JV) SN
Throttleman MM3
Perry has fulfilled this requirement through on-the-
job training, and has recommended a minimum skill level
of QMS, which is concurred in. Attempts by the Perry to
use E-3's in this watch have proven unsatisfactory. This
watch encompasses not only the helmsman and throttleman
skills, but is also the primary communication link between
the OOD and the rest of the Condition III watches, and is
responsible for steering casualty controls since after
steering is unmanned at this condition. In general, the
watch requires someone with an adequate overall knowledge
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of the ship's capabilities. From practical experience,
a QMS is the best fit from the present rating inventory
for this responsibility. Perry, again from practical
experience, has determined that this watch must be
rotated. Reference (f) recommended a sixth bridge watch,
a POOW, which would fulfill the functions noirmally
assigned to the BMOW and QMOW on a traditional bridge.
This recommendation was approved by reference (g) , with
a minimum skill level of SM3/QM3, and incorporated in
reference (c) with a skill level of QMS to permit proper
watch rotation with the Ship Control Console Operator.
In addition, during reference (b) , it was determined
that the communications recorder was not required, since
the ship can adequately maintain the required visual
communications watch using one SM assisted by other on-
watch personnel as required. The only personnel available
for this assistance are the lookouts. For this reason,
it is recommended that the minimum skill level for the
lookouts (2) be upgraded from SN to SMSN. This will
enable the communicator and two lookouts to rotate as
required by reference (h) . This is close to what was
envisioned in the initial intent of the FFG--7 program,
that is, that the lookouts be knowledgeable of the SM
rate. This also eliminates the problem of having SN look-
outs with no possible relief, since there are no other SN
watches with which to rotate, as required by reference (h)
The following Condition III Ship Control Watches are
recommended with associated minimun skill levels:
POOW - QMS
Ship Control Console Operator - QMS
Visual Signal/Messenger - SMSN
Lookouts (2) - SMSN
It is further recommended that once the issues for
the Ship Control Division are resolved, that a unique
staffing standard, combining the QM and SM ratings, be
developed for the FFG-7 class ship. Unless otherwise
directed, originator, designated as Watch Station Data
Base Manager, will initiate this action, separately, upon
issue resolution.
g. During reference (b) , it was concurred in by all
attendees that the billet for the SM Coordinator be
upgraded from an E-6 to a minimum of E-8. Following
rationale was offered:
(1) FFG-7 is a "fully reporting ship" and
documents CM; the SM Coordinator's functional workload
is therefore substantially increased.
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(2) The 3M Coordinator's position is, fundamentally,
a management position vice a technical position. In
accordance with reference (1) , the minimum management
position in the enlisted billet structure exists at the
Senior Chief level. Following revalidation, this command
recommends the 3M Coordinator billet be retained at the
E-6 level. Although the increased responsibility in
rationale (1) is acknowledged, total documented workload
for this billet is 33 hours/week. The 3M Coordinator is
not responsible for the initiation and preparation of CM
supporting documentation, but only for the implementation
and management of the program on board. The additional
responsibility of ensuring CM is properly documented is
well within the general capabilities of an E-6, as defined
in reference (i) . Originator supports the concept proposed
in rationale (2) . However, the paygrade of this billet,
using normal SMD methodology has traditionally been
established based on the total PM workload of the ship,
with billet seniority directly proportional to the PM
package, as follows: (PM figure includes a 30% Make Ready
and Put Away Allowance applied to the raw PM data extracted
from the Planned Maintenance System)
:





This table has been approved by CNO (OP-11) . Although the
responsibility of the 3M Coordinator is somewhat unique on
FFG-7 because of the "fully reporting concept," it is not
unique enough to have the present approved table over-
ridden by the definition of an E-8 as promulgated in
reference (i) . If reference (i) is the overriding con-
sideration, the 3M Coordinator billet in all SMD's should
be changed to a minimum of E-8. To upgrade this billet on
the FFG-7 two paygrades, introduces an inconsistency in
the SMD program that is not supportable by the uniqueness
of this billet's responsibility on the FFG-7 class ship.
Additionally, CNO (OP-111) has indicated that the use of
reference (i) , in SMD development, is to be used as a
guide only, and is not an authoritative source document
with hard, fast restrictions. If OP-111 determines that
reference (i) is the determining consideration, it is
recommended that reference (j), which established the
present table, be cancelled, and OP-111 establish the 3M
Coordinator at the Senior Chief level, as a directed
requirement on all Navy ships.
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i. This issue stated that the assignment of three
E-7 billets to the DC/AUX Division appears excessive.
This issue was addressed by the Warfare Sponsor and was
raised because of CPO berthing limitations on the FFG-7
class ship, although habitability constraints are not a
consideration in determining valid manpower requirements.
However, originator concurs that this staffing is exces-
sive, and was caused by a combination of the following
elements:
(1) The HTC and ENC billets are driven by documented
PMS requirements that call for specific PM actions to be
performed by personnel at the E-7 level. The 3M system has
traditionally been an inviolate cornerstone of the SMD
program, and it is recommended these two billets be
retained at the E-7 level. If the Perry can justify
reducing the skill level required for these PM actions
via the 3-M Feedback Reporting System, it will automatically
reduce the skill level in the SMD program.
(2) The EMC billet is driven by the use of CNO-
approved standard staffing tables. The present staffing
standards for the HT, EN, and EM rates were developed
envisioning these rates in separate divisions (R, A, and
E divisions) . Combining these three rates into one
division results in an excess of supervisory capability
using standard staffing tables. It is recommended that
the EMC billet be downgraded to an EMI billet, CNO resolved
a similar problem with EM's in the RASE division on
selected SURFLANT/SURFPAC replenishment ships in reference
(k) . Recommend the EM staffing table in reference (k) be
utilized for the DC/AUX Division on Perry.
j. Documented workload on Perry supports one HM.
Reference (b) contains two HM's, the second to support the
After Battle Dressing Station at Condition I only. This
was based on originator's interpretation of Required
Operational Capability (ROC) element FSO 10.1, in
reference (1) , which requires a full capability at
Condition 1. Disucssion with the NAVSURFLANT Force
Medical Officer indicates the purpose of -the After Battle
Dressing Station is to serve as a contingency back-up in
the event the Main Battle Dressing Station becomes
inoperable, and was not intended to be manned at Condition
I by the HM rating. It is recommended the second HM
billet be deleted. Using the HM standard staffing tables,
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